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School segregation, school choice and educational policies  
in 100 Hungarian towns 
 
Gábor Kertesi - Gábor Kézdi 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The distribution of Roma and non-Roma students across schools has become considerably more 
unequal in Hungary since the 1980’s. This paper analyzes the effect of school choice and local 
educational policies on that inequality, known as school segregation, in 100 Hungarian towns. We 
combine administrative data with data from a survey that we collected from municipality 
administrations with respect to local educational policies and the ethnic composition of 
neighborhoods. Our results indicate that in Hungarian towns, free school choice diminishes the role 
of residential distribution because many students commute to schools of their choice. Towns where 
such commuting is more pronounced are characterized by stronger inter-school inequalities. We 
also find that local educational policies have, on average, somewhat segregationist tendencies, 
though there is substantial heterogeneity across towns. The more segregationist the local policies 
are, the higher the segregation in the town, thus suggesting that local policies have room to 
influence school segregation in this system. However, the impact of local educational policies is 
weaker than the role of school choice. 
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Iskolai szegregáció, szabad iskolaválasztás és helyi 
oktatáspolitika 100 magyar városban 
 
Kertesi Gábor – Kézdi Gábor 
 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A roma és nem roma tanulók aránya szerinti egyenlőtlenség - az etnikai elkülönülés, másnéven 
szegregáció - nagymértékben megnövekedett a magyar általános iskolák között a nyolcvanas évek 
óta. Jelen tanulmány 100 város adatain vizsgálja a szabad iskolaválasztás és a helyi iskolapolitika 
szerepét az iskolák közötti etnikai szegregációban. Adminisztratív adatokat kombinálunk egy olyan 
kérdőíves felmérés adataival, amit mi folytattunk a városok oktatáspolitikájának és a városokon 
belüli lakóhelyi etnikai elkülönülésnek a feltárására. Eredményeink azt mutatják, hogy a magyar 
városokban a szabad iskolaválasztás csökkenti a lakóhelyi elkülönülés szerepét az iskolák 
közötti szegregációban azáltal, hogy sok, főleg magasabb státuszú tanuló jár lakóhelyétől távolabbi 
iskolába. Azokban a városokban, ahol több tanuló jár lakóhelyétől távolabbi iskolába, az iskolák 
közötti szegregáció is jóval erősebb. Azt is kimutatjuk, hogy a helyi iskolapolitikák átlagosan enyhén 
szegregációs irányba mutatnak, de nagyok az egyes városok közötti különbségek. Azokban a 
városokban, ahol inkább szegregációs tendenciájú az iskolapolitika, az iskolák közötti etnikai 
szegregáció is magasabb, ami azt jelzi, hogy a helyi iskolapolitikának van szerepe az etnikai 
szegregáció alakításában. Eredményeink alapján azonban a szabad iskolaválasztás szerepe jóval 
erősebb, mint a helyi iskolapolitikák szerepe. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: iskolai szegregáció, roma kisebbség, szabad iskolaválasztás, helyi oktatáspolitika 
 
JEL kódok: I24, I28, J15 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The distribution of Roma and non-Roma students across schools has become considerably more 
unequal in Hungary since the 1980’s. A standard index of segregation shows that ethnic segregation 
more than doubled in areas with more than one school (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2012), from below 0.10 
to above 0.20. The increase appears to have been largest in large towns and cities. The causes and 
consequences of that dramatic increase are not yet fully understood. In this paper we show evidence 
that can help understand the causes of school segregation in Hungarian towns. 
School segregation is understood to be the separation of students of different family 
backgrounds into different schools. We focus on primary schools (grades one through eight) and 
segregation by ethnicity: the extent to which Roma and non-Roma students attend the same schools 
and are, as a result, exposed to each other within the context of the schools. The degree of that 
separation is measured by the index of segregation, ranging from zero (even distribution across 
schools) to one (complete separation). We use national school-level data with respect to the fraction 
of Roma students to measure school segregation. Information on selective inter-neighborhood 
commuting of students is available from individual data also at the national level. Local educational 
policies and residential segregation are measured by data from the surveys that we fielded in 100 
Hungarian towns. The localities were selected as they have the largest number of Roma residents, 
excluding Budapest, which is not included due to its size and decentralized municipal structure. 
Besides showing informative descriptive evidence on selective commuting, the segregationist nature 
of local policies and residential segregation, we combine these indicators in a cross-sectional 
statistical analysis to shed light on the importance of each in explaining the degree of school 
segregation across towns. 
Institutional knowledge of the school system in Hungary is necessary for understanding 
potential causes of school segregation. Similar to many other countries in the region, Hungary is 
characterized by the dominance of state-owned primary schools and free school choice. Until 2012, 
schools were owned by local municipalities, and an important part of the school budgets came from 
central subsidies allocated on a per student basis. Municipalities complemented these subsidies 
with funding from their own budgets. School districts were drawn by the municipalities, and schools 
were required to take all children from within their district. However, schools were also permitted 
to admit children from outside the district. Accordingly, the total enrollment in schools was 
determined by capacity, by the demand from within and outside the catchment area, and by the 
allocation decision of the municipality. Starting in 2013, the system became more centralized, but 
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school choice and the most important incentives of schools remained similar. Our results 
correspond to the system in place before 2013. 
A major innovation of our study is a detailed measurement of the segregationist or integrationist 
tendencies of local educational policies. Using data from questionnaire-based interviews conducted 
with the heads of the municipal educational offices, we constructed ten measures of the policy 
instruments that each town could use to influence between-school segregation. The data show that, 
on average, Hungarian towns tend to implement educational policies that promote increasing 
between-school segregation in addition to that implied by student mobility. This segregationist 
tendency is rather moderate, on average. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across towns, 
with some towns promoting more equal ethnic distribution across schools with others practicing 
strongly segregationist policies. 
Together with the policy measures, we collected information to measure residential segregation. 
Local experts were requested to estimate the size of the Roma minority in pre-defined small 
neighborhoods (electoral wards). We then used the data from this survey to construct our best 
estimate for the ethnic residential segregation in the towns examined in our study. According to our 
results, residential segregation is moderate in the 100 towns, and the mean of the index of 
segregation is 0.17. The distribution, however, is skewed as the index in most towns is below 0.10, 
though in a few towns, the segregation index level is higher than 0.4.  
The results of our statistical analysis show that school segregation is significantly associated 
with student mobility, the share of the Roma population in the town and the local educational 
policies. These associations are strong not only one by one but also conditional on each other. In 
other words, for a given share of the Roma population and a given educational policy environment, 
higher mobility of middle class students is associated with higher levels of school segregation. At the 
same time, for a given level of mobility of middle class students and a given educational policy 
environment, a higher share of Roma students is associated with higher levels of school segregation. 
Finally, for given levels of mobility and Roma representation, towns with municipalities that 
implement educational policies that are segregationist in their objectives tend to have higher levels 
of school segregation. Contrary to student mobility, residential segregation is not significantly 
related to school segregation in our data. 
These results suggest that the free school choice system in Hungary increases inequality as 
students self-select into schools from various neighborhoods, a sorting that is, in itself, unequal 
because students of higher status are significantly more likely to commute. As a result of selective 
commuting, between-school inequality is weakly related to, and stronger than, residential 
inequality. Although constrained by residential patterns and student mobility, the local educational 
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administration appears to have room for implementing policies that positively or negatively impact 
the segregationist tendencies.  
These results are consistent with a simple theory of school choice that includes differentiation in 
the perceived quality of schools as well as sorting by ability and family background when placing 
children in schools. From a theoretical point of view, the system of school choice in Hungary is 
similar to a universal system of school vouchers. In such a universal voucher system every student 
would receive a voucher that he or she could redeem in any school of the country and use the 
voucher to pay the tuition fee applicable at the schools. A typical voucher system is a mixed system 
of state-owned schools that are free of charge and private schools that collect tuition. Vouchers are 
used to pay the tuition fee in full, and a universal system makes private schools de facto free of 
charge as well. The most important implications of such a system are applicable to the Hungarian 
system of state-owned schools and free school choice. 
The economics literature on voucher systems specifies the choice situation and its consequences 
in a general equilibrium framework (Manski, 1992; Epple and Romano, 1998, Nechyba, 1999). 
Epple and Romano (1998) provide a model of ‘cream-skimming’ by private schools, modeling 
competition between public and private schools both with and without vouchers. A school’s quality 
in this model is determined exclusively by the mean ability of its student body. Because able pupils 
bestow a positive externality on other students, private schools link the price they charge to 
individual characteristics (ability and income) by offering means-tested scholarships. This leads to 
the main theoretical result: the most expensive private school will attract the students with the 
highest ability and income; then private schools of descending quality will divide up students of 
lower ability and/or income. The public schools in this model act as a residual, taking in the poorest 
and least able pupils. Introducing vouchers causes the number of private schools to increase. 
Students who switch from public to private school as a result of vouchers gain in achievement, 
though some may actually be made worse off (as the voucher reduces the quality of their outside 
option, the public school). Students who remain in the public school, however, are made 
unambiguously worse off, as the quality of their peer group has fallen. As schools do not respond 
positively to competition in this model, it is a pure model of cream-skimming 
The implications of these theories were tested using two natural experiments, the large-scale 
voucher system implemented in Chile and the introduction of the free school choice system in New 
Zealand. The results of Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) suggest that the first-order consequence of the 
Chilean reform was to induce cream-skimming on a large scale. In municipalities with large 
increases in private school market share, public schools displayed large declines in socioeconomic 
status and test scores relative to all schools in the municipality. The experiment in New Zealand had 
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similar consequences. Some families were most likely to opt for higher socioeconomic status 
schools, and that additional choice led minorities to become increasingly concentrated in low 
socioeconomic status schools (Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Ladd and Fiske, 2001).  
Our study complements these studies with the Hungarian experience. School choice became 
widespread in the Hungarian educational system in the early 1990’s. The substantial increase in the 
ethnic inequality of Hungarian schools is consistent with the role of school choice. In this study we 
provide further evidence on the role of school choice by examining variation across the 100 towns in 
our sample with respect to school segregation and the degree of selective commuting of students 
between neighborhoods in each town. The results of our statistical analysis indicate that school 
choice plays a very important role in school segregation. In order to clarify the mechanisms behind 
the effect of school choice on inequality, we present a simplified model.  
In the model, the decision-makers include those families that choose schools for their children 
and those schools that choose students from among the applicants. For the sake of this argument, 
assume that school choice is completely free within the town, that there are no commuting costs, 
and that there are no constraints on admission decisions by the schools. Further assume that 
schools are different in terms of their perceived quality. To make the argument as simple as 
possible, assume that there is a complete ranking among schools and everybody agrees on that 
ranking. It is possible that these perceptions reflect true differences in quality in the sense that the 
higher ranked schools would yield better outcomes from the same students than would the lower 
ranked schools. However, this is not necessary for the argument as it is also possible that those 
perceptions have little to do with actual school quality as long as those perceptions are reinforced, in 
the end, by student outcomes. Assume that students are different, too, in terms of their abilities. 
Schools form perceptions about student abilities by testing, informal conversations before 
admission and so on. Similar to perceptions regarding school quality, perceived skills of students 
may or may not reflect the true abilities of the students. All that is required, however, is that the 
ability ranking of students is perceived to be the same by everybody. We use the word “ability” to 
denote perceived ability and “quality” to denote perceived quality.  
The result of school choice by students and student choice by schools is sorting. The highest 
ability students will be sorted into the highest ranked schools, while the lowest ability students will 
be sorted into the lowest ranked schools. This is a color-blind sorting equilibrium whereby students 
and schools do not take into account the ethnicity of students in any direct way. If, however, 
abilities are correlated with ethnicity, the sorting results in an unequal distribution by ethnicity 
across schools. This simplistic description highlights the important mechanisms that are present in 
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Hungarian towns. If we introduce more realistic elements, the situation becomes more complicated 
but the same mechanisms remain in operation with potentially weaker effects. 
A simple numerical example, illustrated in Figure 1, may help shed light on the mechanisms. 
Consider the following scenario: Towns A and B are small, and they have two schools each while 
towns C and D are large, and they have 10 schools each. All schools are equal in size. For the sake of 
the argument, assume that each school has 100 students. The share of the Roma population is low 
in towns A and C (5 percent) while it is higher in towns B and D (20 percent). Assume that the 
schools are ranked only by perceived quality, with school I1 being the highest ranked school and 
school I2 being a lower ranked school. In the larger towns, the rankings decrease to I10. The rankings 
are homogenous, that is, every decision-maker has the same ranking. Assume, moreover, that 
schools can freely select from those who apply for admission. Assume also that students are ranked 
solely in terms of their perceived abilities and that the Romani students are at the bottom of the 
ranking. Thus, quality and abilities are observable, there are no commuting costs, and there are no 
constraints on admission decisions. The result, as described herein, is a perfect sorting of students 
across schools.  
Perfect sorting also indicates that the Romani students are sorted into the lowest ranked 
schools. Because there are more students than schools, whether and how many schools are filled up 
by Roma students depends on the number of schools and the proportion of the Romani population 
in the town. In particular, in small towns with few Romani students, even if all Romani students 
end up in the same school, they will have non-Roma peers; thus, that they are not completely 
segregated. Conversely, in towns with a higher number of Romani students (because of the 
increased proportion of Roma students in the population or because of a same number but a larger 
population), if all Romani students end up in the same school, they may fill that school resulting in 
complete segregation. 
In town A, this means that school I1 will be 0 percent Roma while school I2 will be 10 percent 
Roma. In town C, schools I1 through I9 will be 0 percent Roma while school I10 will be 50 percent 
Roma. In town B, school I1 will be 0 percent Roma, and school I2 will be 40 percent Roma. In town 
D, schools I1 through I8 will be 0 percent Roma while school I9 and I10 will both be 100 percent 
Roma. Figure 1 summarizes these results. 
The results imply that the towns are ranked in terms of the ethnic inequality of their schools. 
The rankings are unambiguous among towns that have the same size (numbers of school) but 
different ethnic composition (share of Romani students). The results are also unambiguous among 
towns that have the same ethnic composition but are different in size. 
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In terms of the segregation indices (introduced in section 3), the towns are ranked as follows.1  
For a fixed share of Roma students in towns that vary by size: 
 
C A
D B
S S
S S
 
 For towns fixed in size that vary with respect to their share of Roma students: 
 
B A
D C
S S
S S
 
 
If we hold the percentage of Romani students in the town constant, larger towns are 
characterized by higher levels of segregation. At the same time, if we hold town size constant, towns 
with higher percentages of Romani students are characterized by higher levels of segregation. This 
finding is demonstrated in the statistical analysis, as will be presented herein. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces the data and discusses 
the details of the measurement. The third section shows the levels and trends of school segregation 
in the 100 towns included in the sample. The fourth section describes residential segregation. The 
fifth section presents the results of our main statistical analysis, and the last section concludes our 
findings. The five appendices (A through E) contain more detailed information on the composition 
of our sample, the robustness of our results, the definitions of the policy instruments, the policy 
attitude measures, and the questionnaire on local policy measures. 
                                                 
1The numerical results are SA=0.05, SB=0.39, SC=0.40, SD=1.00.  SB<SC is a result of the particular numerical 
example. Thus, the theory does not imply anything about the relationship. 
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Figure 1. 
A polar example of achievement-based sorting  
Number of 
schools in 
the town 
             Ratio of Roma students in the town 
low 
 (5 %) 
high  
(20 %) 
 
 
 
 
 
low 
(2 schools) 
 
 
Town A 
Roma %:  I1 = 0 %,  I2 = 10 % 
Segregation index (SA):  0.05 
 
 
 
Town B 
Roma %:  I1 = 0 %,  I2 = 40 % 
Segregation index (SB): 0.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
high 
(10 schools) 
 
Town C 
Roma %: I1 – I9 = 0 %,  I10 = 50 % 
Segregation index (SC):  0.40 
 
 
Town D 
Roma %: I1 – I8 = 0 %,  I9 – I10 = 100 % 
Segregation index (SD):  1.00 
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2. DATA AND METHODS 
2.1 SAMPLE 
The sample consists of the 100 towns and cities with the greatest Roma population, excluding 
Budapest, which is excluded because of its size and decentralized municipality structure. The 
sampling used information on the number of all students in primary schools, the number of 
primary schools and the proportion of Roma students in primary schools. (Typical primary schools 
include students in grades 1 through 8.) Information is obtained from the school-level files of the 
National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC). See section 2.2 for more details on the schools 
included.  
There are more than 200 towns and cities in Hungary, and there are over 2500 villages. Many of 
the towns are small (20 have only a single school, and an additional 46 have only two schools). 
While there is an administrative distinction between cities and towns in Hungary, we use the term 
“town” to denote both towns and cities. The target thresholds for selection were that the town must 
have a minimum of 1000 students, at least two schools, and an estimated Roma fraction above 3 per 
cent (the 3 per cent cutoff is determined to be one quarter of the estimated average fraction of 12 
per cent in all towns and cities). Because of replacements and data corrections, the final sample 
consisted of a few towns that did not meet the size criterion or the established Roma representation 
criterion.  
Table 1 shows some statistics about our sample. The median number of schools in the towns in 
our sample is 7, while the average is 10. The median number of students is 1900, while the average 
is 3000. The median town in the sample has 10 percent Roma students, the mean is over 13 per 
cent, and the maximum is over 50 per cent. Note that one town in the sample has only one school. 
However, while we left it in for the descriptive analysis, all analyses on school segregation will 
naturally omit this town (making the effective sample size 99). Table A.1 in Appendix A contains the 
list of all cities and towns in the main sample and the replacement sample, together with 
information on the number of students and the estimated fraction of Roma students. It also shows 
the number of electoral wards. 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample (2006 data) 
 Population No. electoral 
wards 
No. schools No. all students Fraction of  
Roma students (%) 
Mean 31,289 30 10 3,013 13.1 
Median 18,611 20 7 1,939 9.8 
Minimum 4,301 4 1 663 1.7 
Maximum 207,270 190 54 18,288 53.6 
 
2.2 MEASURING SCHOOL SEGREGATION 
School segregation of a particular town is measured using the number of students and the fraction 
of Roma students in each school within the town. We use data from the Hungarian National 
Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) for the years of 2006 through 2010. The NABC is a 
standards based assessment that tests reading and mathematical skills in grades 4, 6 and 8 in 
primary schools (as well as grade 10 in secondary schools). The NABC became standardized in 
2006, and we use all data from 2006 through 2010 for our analysis. 
In addition to testing the students, the NABC collects additional data on students and schools. 
School-level data are collected from the school principals. The measurement occurs in May of each 
year, and school-level data are collected during the same time. Among other things, the school-level 
data contain information on the number of students and the school principal’s estimate of the 
fraction of Roma students in the school. When there are missing data, we use data from the 
surrounding years. The information is collected for each school site, i.e., each unit of the school with 
a separate address. This is important because in some towns schools as administrative units are 
comprised of units at multiple locations, which are sometimes quite far from each other. 
Throughout the study, we use the word “school” to denote the school site and use the word 
“institution” to denote the administrative organization that may consist of more than one school 
site. 
Our analysis contains all Hungarian that teach primary school students.  Of these schools, the 
NABC includes all schools that had students enrolled in grade four or grade eight in 2006 and 2007, 
and all schools that had students in grades six and eight in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Inclusion of all 
schools, however, by the NABC is limited because it does not include those institutions that teach 
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students of special educational needs (SEN students) after 2007. The main goal of the NABC is 
testing, and as a rule, SEN students are not tested, with the exception of the year of 2006. The 
institutions that focus on SEN students were included by the NABC in 2006, and they remained in 
the data collection frame for the following year. These institutions were, however, dropped from the 
data collection frame starting with 2008. Another source of bias is that the information regarding 
the fraction of Roma students is missing in some schools that do participate in the NABC. 
Accordingly, in addition to the problem of SEN students, non-response becomes another reason for 
missing data.  
Missing data can bias the segregation indices. Suppose, for example, that the school in which the 
principal fails to provide information has no Roma students. In that case, our measures of exposure 
overestimate exposure and, therefore, underestimate segregation because the schools with this 
missing information have exposure levels below the average. In principle, it is also possible that 
schools with missing data have ethnic compositions that are very close to the town-level average, in 
which case, our measure of segregation would be biased upwards. 
Table 2 shows the prevalence of missing data. It shows the number of institutions from the 
administrative files (KIR-STAT), the number of institutions in the NABC database, the number of 
schools in the NABC database (recall that we define schools as those with separate mailing 
addresses; some institutions have more than one school), and the number of schools with valid 
data. Administrative sources (KIR-STAT) have information on the number of students at the 
institution level but not at the school level as we define them. KIR-STAT has no information on the 
ethnic composition of schools. 
Table 2. 
Number of institutions and schools in the sample of 100 towns 
 Number of institutions  Number of school sites 
 
All 
( from KIR-
Stat) 
In the 
NABC 
data 
 In the 
NABC 
data  
In the NABC data  
and non-missing fraction of 
Roma students 
2006 808 794   1,014 860 
2007 801 788   931 746 
2008 688 615   835 770 
2009 666 602   841 769 
2010 649 579   838 754 
Notes. “Schools” are defined by their physical location (address); “institutions” may contain more than 
one school. We consider primary schools (and their institutions) that teach students from grade 1 
through grade 8. KIR-STAT: the administrative register for all educational institutions in Hungary. 
NABC (National Assessment of Basic Competences) is the national standards based assessment, with 
tests in reading and mathematics in grades 4, 6 and 8. Students with special educational needs do not 
participate in the assessment, except in year 2006. The school-level data in NABC cover all schools 
with at least one student who participates in the assessment. 
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There are two problems: missing schools in the NABC database (and thus missing information 
on the Roma students) as well as missing information on the Roma students for some schools in the 
NABC database. We address the first problem by assuming that the missing institutions are one-
school institutions and imputing the KIR-STAT student numbers. We address the problem of 
missing Roma data in three alternative ways. The benchmark imputation is our best guess. We 
complement this with an imputation that leads to the lowest possible value of the index of 
segregation and one that leads to the highest possible value.2 All of our results are verified using the 
alternative missing data treatments as well, and those alternative results are summarized in 
Appendix B. 
Following the literature (e.g., Clotfelter, 2004), we measure segregation with the help of the 
following three indices: exposure of non-Roma students to Roma students (ENR), exposure of 
Roma students to non-Roma students (ERN), and the standardized version of these indices, 
referred to herein as the segregation index (S). When we calculate the extent of exposure or 
segregation, we examine schools within a town. To define and interpret these indices, we apply the 
following notations. 
Ij is the number of schools in town j, 
Nij is the number of students in school i in town j, 
Nj is the number of students in town j, 
Rij is the number of Roma students in school i in town j, 
Rj is the number of Roma students in town j, 
rij is the fraction of the Roma students among all students in school i in town j, 
rj is the fraction of the Roma students among all students in town j, 
(1 – rij) is the fraction of the non-Roma students among all students in school i in town j, 
(1 – rj) is the fraction of the non-Roma students among all students in town j, 
(Nij –Rij)/(Nj –Rj) is the fraction of non-Roma students in school i among all non-Roma students in 
town j, and 
Rij/Rj is the fraction of Roma students in school i among all Roma students in town j. 
                                                 
2 The benchmark procedure first imputes the fraction of Roma students from the years with available 
information and then uses the fraction of poor students in the school as information. The remaining schools 
(approximately 30 each year) were left as missing. The imputation that leads to the lowest possible value of 
the index of segregation imputes the town-level average fraction of Roma students for the missing data. The 
imputation that leads to the highest value of the index of segregation imputes zero or one for the missing 
fraction of Roma students in a way that maintains the overall fraction of Roma students unchanged (assigning 
values one to the smaller schools and zero to the larger ones following the observed relationship in the non-
missing data). 
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Index ENRj measures the exposure of an average (a randomly chosen) non-Roma student in 
town j to the possibility of meeting Roma students. ENRj is equal to the fraction of Roma students 
in each school averaged over schools, where the average is taken with weights that are equal to the 
share of non-Roma students in the school among all non-Roma students in the town. Formally:  
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The minimum value of the exposure index is zero. In such a case, no contact is possible between 
Roma and non-Roma students within the schools because the schools are either all-non-Roma (thus 
rij=0) or all-Roma (thus Nij–Rij=0). The maximum value of exposure is when the fraction of 
minority students in each school is equal to the fraction in the town: rij=rj for all i in j. For ENRj to 
make sense, we need 0 <rj< 1, i.e., there must be both Roma and non-Roma students in town j. This 
condition is satisfied in all towns that we consider. 
The exposure of Roma students to non-Roma students (ERNj) is analogous as it measures the 
exposure of an average (randomly chosen) Roma student in town j to the possibility of meeting non-
Roma students. ERNj is equal to the fraction of non-Roma students in each school averaged over 
schools, where the average is taken with weights that are equal to the share of Roma students in the 
school among all Roma students in the town. Formally: 
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The minimum value of this exposure index is also zero, and ERNj= 0 exactly when ENRj= 0. 
Such a value indicates that no contact is possible among Roma and non-Roma students within the 
schools because the schools are either all-Roma (1–rij=0) or all-non-Roma (rij=0). The maximum 
value of Roma exposure is when the fraction of non-Roma students in each school is equal to the 
fraction of Roma students in the town: 1–rij=1–rj for all i in j. The two indices are intimately related: 
1 j
j j
j
r
ERN ENR
r
 
Despite their intuitive content, the exposure indices are rarely used. The reason is that their 
value depends on the overall fraction of minority students, which poses a severe constraint on their 
use in comparing segregation across time or geographic units. It is the segregation index that is 
intended to solve this problem. As the index of segregation is a normalized version of the exposure 
indices, it retains their information content, albeit in a less intuitive way. The normalization 
amounts to comparing exposure to its attainable maximum. There is also a reversal of sign such that 
higher levels of the index indicate higher levels of segregation (less exposure). Intuitively, the 
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segregation index shows the fraction of contact possibilities that are made impossible by 
segregation. Formally, 
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The maximum value of the index is one; therefore, segregation is at its maximum when the 
exposure is zero. The minimum value is zero, which is attained at maximum exposure, when the 
fraction of Roma students is the same in every school. 
To understand the magnitudes, we consider the value of these indices in another context. 
American metropolitan areas that have segregation indices similar to the segregation indices of the 
larger Hungarian towns (as we shall show) include San Diego (0.28), Phoenix (0.31) and Los 
Angeles (0.33). These are not among the most segregated American cities as the segregation index 
in New York City is 0.45, in Chicago it is 0.57, and in the most segregated metropolitan area, that of 
Detroit, the segregation index is 0.71 (see Clotfelter, 1999, p. 494). 
2.3 MEASURING RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 
Residential segregation is defined as inequality in the ethnic composition of neighborhoods within 
towns. The formulae used for measuring segregation are analogous to those used for measuring 
school segregation, with the number of residents and the fraction of Roma residents in 
neighborhoods substituted for the number of students and the fraction of Roma students in schools, 
respectively. In contrast to the ethnic composition of schools, no comprehensive data exist on the 
ethnic composition of neighborhoods.3 
We collected data on the ethnic composition of neighborhoods within the 100 towns of our 
analysis by asking local experts in each town to estimate the number or fraction of Roma residents 
in small neighborhoods (electoral wards). In each town, four local experts were asked to review the 
map of their town and provide estimates of the Roma population. Table 3 identifies the experts we 
asked and the information we sought from each.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3In principle, the national census data are the best source of information as they cover the entire country and 
provide figures for very small geographic units, the census tracks. Unfortunately, however, ethnicity is not 
measured well in the census. 
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Table 3.  
Sources of information for the residential data, units of measurement  
and conversion to population figures. 
 Unit of measurement Conversion to population 
figures 
Local Roma organization Number of Roma families Multiplied by average family 
size in towns and cities from the 
Roma Survey of 2003 
Director of family support 
services in the municipality 
Number of Roma children  Multiplied by the ratio of 
population to children, from the 
Roma Survey of 2003 
Chief infant health visitor 
(travelling nurse who visits 
families with newborns) 
Number of Roma children of 
age 0 to 3 
Multiplied by the ratio of 
population to 0-3-year-old 
children from the Roma Survey 
of 2003 
Director of the office of 
education in the municipality 
Number of Roma children in 
primary schools (grades 1 
through 8) 
Multiplied by the ratio of 
population to primary school 
students (1-8 grades) from the 
Roma Survey of 2003 
 
Unfortunately, we could collect valid information from all four sources of information from only 
38 of the 100 towns (the numbers of valid cases and average answer values are shown in Table 4). 
Three sources were available in another 30 towns, 25 towns provided information from two sources, 
and six towns from only one source. The estimated share of the Roma population, overall, is very 
similar from the four different sources of information when all four are available (see the last 
columns in the table). This validates both the individual sources (on average) and our method of 
converting their estimates to population shares using outside data sources. At the same time, when 
all available information is used for the various sources, the Roma organizations and the 
educational offices provide significantly higher figures (the first columns in the table). Together 
with the previous results, this suggests that the share of the Roma population is most likely higher 
than average in the towns where values are missing from the other two sources (i.e., from the health 
visitors and the family support services). 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
Table 4.  
Estimated share of Roma population in the towns based  
on the four sources of information 
 All non-missing information 
by source 
 Restricted to the towns with non-
missing information from all four 
sources 
 Mean share of 
Roma 
population 
Number 
of towns 
 Mean share of Roma 
population 
Number of 
towns 
Local Roma organization 0.12 83  0.09 38 
Director of family support 
services in the municipality 
0.08 74  0.08 38 
Chief health visitor 
(travelling nurse who visits 
families with newborns) 
0.08 76  0.08 38 
Director of the office of 
education in the 
municipality 
0.10 65  0.08 38 
 
Where information is available, all four measures provide useful data. Correlations between the 
shares of the Roma population across information sources are moderate, ranging from 0.48 to 0.84, 
according to Table 5. This suggests that one must combine all the information. 
Table 5.  
Pairwise correlation of the estimated share of the Roma population  
in election wards by the four sources of information 
  
Local Roma 
organization 
Family support 
services 
Infant health 
visitors 
Education 
office 
Local Roma organization 1.000    
Family support services 0.483 1.000   
Infant health visitors 0.540 0.712 1.000  
Education office 0.394 0.837 0.550 1.000 
 
To maximize the information content in the estimates and minimize their noise content, we took 
the average population figure for each election from all information that was available. For further 
checks, we compared these estimates to corresponding figures calculated from the national census 
of 2001. We obtained census track-level information on the Roma population from the census of 
2001. The census Roma data are very imperfect and strongly downward biased as the estimated 
share of the Roma population is below 2 per cent compared to corresponding estimates of 
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approximately 6 per cent using other, more reliable data sources (Kemény and Janky, 2006). As 
census tracks are smaller units than election wards, we aggregated the census-track level data.4 
Consistent with the assumption that they are lower estimates, we use the census figures to identify 
election wards where our estimates of the Roma population were too small and were below the 
census numbers. In case of such conflicts, we replaced our estimates with the census figures. 
2.4 MEASURING THE INTEGRATIONIST/SEGREGATIONIST TENDENCIES OF LOCAL 
EDUCATIONAL POLICIES 
Information on educational policies was collected from the director of educational services in each 
municipality. During the interview, the respondent complemented preloaded school-level 
information and answered a questionnaire on policy measures and events in the town during the 
past 5 years. The interviewer collected all of the relevant documents from the municipality to back 
up oral information with official written documents. 
The questionnaire followed the logic of the policy instrument measures that had been designed 
to characterize local educational policies. In addition to the policy instrument measures, the 
questionnaire provided information for a variable that measures the general attitudes of the 
administration with respect to equal opportunities in the school (discussed herein in this section). 
The detailed definition of the policy instruments is contained in Appendix C, in the form of decision 
trees that code the information into relevant variables. The questionnaire itself can be found in 
Appendix E. Each policy instrument variable measures whether the municipality of the town used 
the instrument in the past five years and its reasons for using the instrument. 
Policy instruments are defined as measures that the educational administration of the 
municipality can take, and which measures can have a direct impact on the ethnic composition of 
schools in town. To facilitate the statistical analysis, for each instrument, we created a variable that 
can take on three values, 0, 1, and -1. These numbers denote whether the instrument was used, and 
if yes, whether its usage had the intended direction of increasing or decreasing school segregation. 
Value 0 was assigned if the instrument was not used, or if by using it, the administration did not 
interfere with spontaneous tendencies in the town. In other words, value zero was assigned to an 
instrument in a town where the administration did not actively use that instrument to increase or 
decrease school segregation. We assigned value 1 if the administration in the town used the 
instrument in a way that, in principle, should have increased between-school segregation. 
Analogously, we assigned value -1 if the administration in the town used the instrument in a way 
                                                 
4In some cases, census tracks belonged to multiple election wards, and we assigned them to the election ward 
to which the largest part of them belonged – data limitations prevented us from splitting them across wards. 
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that, in principle, should have decreased between-school segregation. Importantly, it is not the 
actual effect that determined whether we coded each instrument as -1, 0 or 1. Instead, the value was 
determined a priori, based on whether the mechanism induced by the instrument (or the way the 
instrument was implemented) could increase or decrease between-school segregation in the 
institutional context of Hungarian education. When the administration used a particular 
instrument more than once, we coded each occurrence separately and calculated the average. 
Table 6 provides an overall account of our policy instruments including distributions of towns 
with respect to the use of different local educational policy instruments. In the event of the multiple 
use of an instrument in a town, average values were calculated. A value of 0 for each instrument 
represents a passive attitude on the part of the municipality; positive values denote active steps that 
point to increased ethnic inequality, and negative values denote active steps towards decreasing 
inequality. Some of the instruments capture the failure of the municipalities to take administrative 
steps that they are legally required to take. These failures were coded as active segregationist steps.   
Four of the ten instruments show no particular tendencies on average, another four show mild 
segregationist tendencies on average, and two are strongly segregationist. Starting with the 
strongest, most municipalities fail to maintain the representation of Roma students in mostly non-
Roma schools (whether municipal or non-municipal schools). Quite a few municipalities let their 
higher status (“elite”) schools practice admission policies that are segregationist, and many allow 
segregated Roma schools to exist. Some but not many municipalities use school mergers and 
modifications of school district boundaries to increase inequalities between schools.  
In principle, the policy instruments may be used as substitutes, as complements, or as 
independent from each other. They are substitutes if municipalities use one instrument instead of 
the other to achieve their goals (or simply to comply with or meet the forces within the system). The 
instruments are complements if using one reinforces the effects of another one, and thus, using two 
together is more effective than the sum of using either. It turns out that there are no clear patterns 
in the usage of instruments that would indicate systematic relationships between or among them. 
As shown in Table 7, the individual policy instruments are very weakly correlated with each other. 
Of the 43 correlation coefficients, only 4 are significant, and even those are weak. Most importantly, 
we see no significant negative correlations that would indicate the use of one to occur systematically 
when another policy is avoided. The lack of correlations, and negative correlations in particular, 
implies a very straightforward aggregation procedure. That is, we simply average the values of the 
10 instruments and compose a one-dimensional policy index. 
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Table 6. 
Local educational policy instruments (P): Their content and distribution across towns 
Policy Instruments 
Number of towns with 
instrument values 
N. of 
valid 
cases 
(towns) 
Mean 
values 
Std. 
Devi-
ations -1 -1 to 0 0 0 to 1 1 
P1. Closing of schools 4 1 76 0 6 87 0.02 0.34 
P2. Merger of schools 0 0 71 9 6 86 0.12 0.28 
P3. Reducing the number of school 
districts on a large scale 
0 0 89 0 11 100 0.11 0.31 
P4. Merging school districts or 
modifying school catchment area 
boundaries 
15 1 72 0 10 98 -0.06 0.51 
P5. Changing the school provider: 
transforming municipal schools into 
parochial or not for profit private 
schools 
0 0 93 0 1 94 0.01 0.10 
P6. Admission policies of municipal 
elite schools 
1 0 68 3 25 97 0.26 0.46 
P7. Ensuring proper representation 
of Roma students in municipal 
schools where the proportion of 
Roma students is low 
4 1 33 8 54 100 0.52 0.57 
P8. Supporting the establishment of 
new parochial or not for profit 
private schools 
0 0 91 0 8 99 0.08 0.27 
P9. Intervention against segregation 
targeting non-municipal schools (to 
meet Roma proportion benchmarks) 
7 0 26 1 48 91 0.57 0.63 
P10. Policies towards segregated 
Roma schools 
6 1 51 4 32 94 0.29 0.58 
Notes. The values of each instrument are coded as follows:  
v = 0 non-activist position (or the instrument is not used);  
v =1 segregationist attitude / behavior; 
v = -1 integrationist attitude / behavior 
 
nem (0) 
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Table 7. 
Correlation matrix of the Local Educational Policy Instruments I1 through I10 
  I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 I10 
I1 1.000 
         
I2 0.053 1.000 
        
I3 0.082 0.066 1.000 
       
I4 0.006 0.146 0.038 1.000 
      
I5 -0.010 -0.048 -0.036 0.223* 1.000 
     
I6 -0.111 -0.172 -0.205 -0.098 0.173 1.000 
    
I7 0.130 0.038 -0.005 -0.118 -0.098 0.044 1.000 
   
I8 -0.019 0.211 0.013 0.107 0.365** -0.002 0.051 1.000 
  
I9 -0.079 0.064 -0.087 -0.090 0.076 0.054 -0.008 0.146 1.000  
 I10 0.035 0.108 -0.016 -0.054 n.a. -0.025 0.063 0.043 -0.064 1.000 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. ** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
 
In addition to policy instruments, we collected information on administrative measures that do 
not have a direct effect on the composition of schools, but rather reflect the general attitudes of the 
administration with respect to equal opportunities in the schools. able 8 provides an overall account 
of these attitude instruments and their statistics. The detailed definitions are contained in Appendix 
D. 
Three out of the five measures point to more segregationist attitudes on average, while two 
measures are, on average, neutral. Municipalities from the 100 towns in the sample are slightly 
more likely to classify students into “home schooling” status, and they have a slight tendency to 
restrict kindergarten access in a selective way, against poor children, in the event of capacity 
constraints. A stronger tendency is observed in neglecting the problem of the registration of 
students with “multiple disadvantages”. The remaining two measures are balanced, and these 
include classifying students into the special educational need (SEN) status and 
encouraging/discouraging Roma children to participate in kindergarten education. 
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Table 8. 
General educational policy attitudes (A): Their content and distribution across towns 
Attitude instruments 
Number of towns 
with instrument 
values 
N. of 
valid 
cases 
(towns) 
Mean 
values 
Std. 
Devi-
ations 
-1 0 1 
A1. Restricting the practice of exceedingly 
classifying students into SEN status  
4 76 6 87 0.02 0.34 
A2. Classifying students into “home-
schooled” status  
0 71 6 86 0.12 0.28 
A3. Preventing poor children from being 
crowded-out of kindergarten in case of lack 
of facilities 
0 89 11 100 0.11 0.31 
A4 .Encouraging participation of Roma 
children in kindergartens 
15 72 10 98 -0.06 0.51 
A5. Neglecting the problem of registration of 
students with “multiple disadvantages” 
6 51 32 94 0.29 0.58 
Notes. The values of each instrument are coded as follows:  
v = 0 for neutral position;  
v =1 for neglecting equal opportunities; 
v = -1 for enhancing equal opportunities. 
 
3. LEVEL AND TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION 
We measure the ethnic composition of primary schools and segregation between schools using data 
from the Hungarian National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) for the years of 2006 
through 2010. Primary schools in Hungary include students in grade 1 through grade 8. Section 2.1 
described the data in more detail. Table 9 shows the ethnic composition of primary schools and the 
measures of ethnic segregation within the 100 towns. The table shows weighted averages where the 
weights are the size of the student population in each town. 
The fraction of Roma students in the 100 towns averages 11 per cent, and this statistic is stable 
across the five years in the sample. The exposure of non-Roma students to Roma students averages 
8 per cent throughout the period. The average exposure of Roma students to non-Roma students 
has increased from 69 per cent in 2006 to 73 per cent in 2010. The index of segregation, measuring 
the distance from actual exposure to its theoretical maximum, decreased from 0.23 to 0.19. 
Virtually all of the decreases in segregation occurred between 2006 and 2008. Note, however, that 
as we indicated in section 2.2 above, missing data on the ethnic composition of schools can be 
handled in various ways. Our benchmark imputation, used for the calculations presented in Table 9, 
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represent our best estimates for the missing information. Alternative imputations may (and, as we 
shall see, do) result in numbers that can be very different. 
Table 9. 
Ethnic composition and ethnic segregation of primary schools in 100 Hungarian 
towns, 2006 through 2010. The fraction of Roma students, the indices of exposure 
and the index of segregation. 
Average values 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Change between 2006 
and 2010 
Fraction of Roma students 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 
Exposure of non-Roma students to 
Roma students 
0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.00 
Exposure of Roma students to 
non-Roma students 
0.69 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.04 
Index of segregation 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19 -0.04 
Notes. Average values using the benchmark imputation weighted by student population. 
 
Figure 2 puts the observed changes in historical context and shows bounds for four calculations 
using alternative imputations for the missing data in 2006 to 2010. The figure shows the time series 
of the index of segregation from 1980 through 2010 averaged over the 100 towns in the sample. We 
accessed administrative school data (the predecessor of KIR-STAT) for 1980, 1989 and 1992, and all 
files contained information on the number of Roma students in each school.5 Beginning with 2006, 
the average segregation index is based on our benchmark imputations. The figure indicates the 
range of the maximum and minimum potential values by a grey area. Strictly speaking, the index of 
segregation can be anywhere within this area. However, our best estimate is the continuous black 
line. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 During these years (1980, 1989, 1992), there were no multiple-school institutions, and every school provided 
data on the number of Roma students. The collection of data on Roma students was discontinued after the 
school year of 1992/3. 
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Figure 2. 
 
The time series of the ethnic segregation index  
between primary schools.  
Average index of 100 Hungarian towns,  
1980 through 2010.  
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Black line: our benchmark imputations for missing data.  
Grey area: theoretical lower and upper bounds using alternative imputations. 
 
The ethnic segregation of the primary schools in the 100 towns in our study increased 
substantially between 1992 and 2006. This increase is significantly large in magnitude and is also 
robust with respect to the imputation method we choose for missing data in 2006. As previously 
documented, our best estimate for the index shows a significant decline of between-school 
segregation in the 100 towns between 2006 and 2008. The slope of the decreasing trend is 
comparable to the slope of the previous increase, thus resulting in a small drop because of the short 
period. However, in contrast to the previous increase, the decrease is not at all robust to the 
imputation method. As presented in  
Table, our best estimates indicate a slight increase in between-school segregation after 2008, 
though this trend is not robust to the imputation method. The grey area in Figure 2 suggests that 
while our best estimate for the index of segregation in 2006 is 0.21, it could, in principle, range 
between 0.19 and 0.27. By 2008, our best estimate puts the index at 0.17, but this could, in 
principle, range anywhere from 0.12 and 0.27. Obviously, changes of different directions and 
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magnitudes are possible between the points of these two intervals. The missing information in the 
NABC database prevents us from identifying trends after 2006.6 
The averages hide wide dispersions. In 2010, the fraction of Roma students in the 100 towns 
varied from as low as 2 per cent to as high as 63 per cent. However, between 2006 and 2010, not 
only has the mean but the distribution across the 100 towns has also remained stable (the 
histograms are shown in Figure 3). This is not surprising, however, as the five year sample period is 
a short time for any substantial changes to occur in the fraction of Roma students. 
Figure 3. 
The distribution of the fraction of Roma students across 100 Hungarian towns.  
2006 and 2010. 
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The index of segregation is even more dispersed. In 2010, it varied between 0 and 0.72 
(according to our benchmark imputations). Contrary to the overall fraction of Roma students in the 
towns, the distribution of the index of segregation has changed between 2006 and 2010 (the 
histograms are shown in Figure 4). The share of towns with index value less than 10 per cent 
increased from 26 per cent to over 40 per cent. The share of towns between 10 and 20 per cent 
decreased from 40 per cent to 20 per cent. Similar changes are observed at the right tail of the 
distribution: the mass of the distribution shifted to the left a little bit (except for the one outlier in 
2010). Similarly to the average changes, these particular shifts in the distribution are not robust to 
                                                 
6 In a recently published paper (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2012) , we used data on the ethnic composition of all 
Hungarian schools to document the degree of between-school segregation at the national level. That analysis 
considered school segregation within school catchment areas, which were defined as clusters of villages, 
towns and cities that were closed in terms of student commuting. Typically, the 100 towns analyzed in this 
study are parts of school catchment areas that include the towns as well as some of the surrounding villages. 
The trends of school segregation within catchment areas around towns and cities are very similar to the 
trends within the towns shown we document in this study. 
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the treatment of the missing data. However, they indicate that between-school segregation may 
have decreased significantly in some of the towns. 
Figure 4. 
The distribution of the index of ethnic segregation across 100 Hungarian towns, 
 2006 and 2010. Benchmark imputations. 
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4. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND STUDENT MOBILITY 
Without school choice, residential segregation and the boundaries of school catchment areas would 
determine school segregation. However, school choice can alter the picture in significant ways. In 
principle, school choice could lead to lower levels of segregation if minority students could commute 
to schools in neighborhoods dominated by majority students. With all likelihood, however, 
incentives and information structures in the Hungarian school system work the other way around. 
Majority students tend to commute more, thus leaving students from the disadvantaged minority 
cluster in schools even more than what residential segregation and area boundaries would imply. 
There may also be “tipping points” in the fraction of minority students in schools above which 
“white flight” may occur, leading to an ever increasing fraction of minority students being left 
behind. 
Using the estimates of the share of the Roma population in election wards (see the data section) 
and the overall population, we constructed the residential segregation index in a way that is 
analogous to the school segregation index. Figure 5 shows the histogram (empirical density 
function) of the residential segregation index (which we denote by L) in the 100 towns of our 
analysis. The mean of the index across towns is 0.17, and the standard deviation is 0.16 (figures 
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weighted by population are essentially the same). The lowest residential segregation index is 0, the 
highest is 0.63, and the median is 0.11. 
Figure 5. 
Distribution of the residential segregation index (L)  
across 100 Hungarian towns in Hungary 
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Figure 6 shows the relationship of residential segregation denoted by index L, on the one hand, 
and town size measured by the (log of) total population and the share of Roma population, on the 
other hand. The figure suggests that the relationship between residential segregation and town size 
is weakly negative in terms of the mean and that the heterogeneity of towns in terms of their 
residential segregation also decreases with size. The opposite is true for the relationship between 
residential segregation and the share of the Roma population. A larger share of the Roma 
population is associated with slightly higher levels of residential segregation. Importantly, however, 
these relationships are all very weak. Towns differ in terms of their residential segregation because 
of factors that are unaccounted for by conventional measures of size and ethnic composition. 
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Figure 6. 
Residential segregation (index L), population and the share of the Roma population 
across 100 Hungarian towns in Hungary 
Panel 1 
Residential segregation (index L) and (log) 
population 
Panel 2 
Residential segregation (index L) and the 
share of Roma population 
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The role of residential segregation in school segregation can be modified by commuting. 
Commuting to schools that are not the closest to the student’s residence is a key feature of the 
Hungarian primary school system because of school choice. Commuting is socially selective. 
Student background data from the National Assessment of Basic Competences (NABC) show 
substantial differences in the social status of commuters. In the population of 8th grade students in 
the 100 towns in 2009, less than 25 per cent of the lower status students (mother’s education is 8 
grades or less) commuted to a school outside their own school catchment area. The same figure for 
higher status students (mother’s education is 12 grades or more) is 50 per cent. Mobile students are 
looking for “better” schools than the school in their own district, which may mean either better 
teachers and facilities or “better” (higher status or higher ability) schoolmates. 
There is a clear and strong positive association between the number of schools in a town and the 
mobility of higher-status children to schools outside the catchment area of their residence. Figure 7 
shows the scatter plot. The association is strongly positive, and it is close to linear in the log of the 
number of schools. This implies a positive but concave relationship in terms of the number of 
schools in the town. The magnitude of the association is very strong. In towns with only a few 
schools, less than 20 per cent of middle-class students commute to schools that are not the closest 
to their residence. In towns with 10 schools, this fraction is over 40 per cent. In towns with 40 
schools, the fraction is approximately 60 per cent.  
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Figure 7. 
Student mobility and the size of the educational market 
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The fraction of high status students (mother’s education: general secondary or diploma) 
attending a school that is not in the school catchment area of their residence (vertical axis) and the 
number of schools in the town (horizontal axis; average between 2006 and 2010, logarithmic scale) 
In towns with larger educational markets, the number of schools is greater, and thus there is 
more room for diversity and, in turn, more room for hierarchical sorting as well. Figure 8 shows 
that larger educational markets are, indeed, characterized by more diverse schools. The figure 
shows the association between the number of schools within the town and the heterogeneity of 
schools in the town in terms of test scores. This heterogeneity is measured by the between-school 
standard deviation of the school-level average test scores measured in 8th grade, and both this 
standard deviation and the number of schools in the town are averaged across the years of the 
investigation (2006 through 2010).  
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Figure 8. 
Between-school heterogeneity and the size of the educational market. 
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Standard deviation of school-level average test scores in 8th grade within each town (vertical 
axis) and the number of schools in the town (horizontal axis; average between 2006 and 2010, 
logarithmic scale) 
 
Figure 8 shows a positive association between the size of the educational market and the 
heterogeneity schools. The association is stronger for the mathematics test scores, and it is concave 
in the number of schools (the concavity is strong as the relationship is log-concave and seems to 
level out above 20 schools).  
Taken together, the evidence shown in Figures 7 and 8 clearly supports the sorting argument. 
The argument is as follows. If there is a clear hierarchy across the schools in terms of their perceived 
quality, children with better prior skill signals (kindergarten results, admission test results or social 
status signals) will strive to gain admittance into the top segment of the school hierarchy. Worse 
signals mean weaker chances to be enrolled into the top schools. Schools in the bottom rank are 
filled with children with the worst signals. The process is regulated by the commuting behavior of 
high status children during the kindergarten-school transition (enrollment into grade 1), and, in 
larger cities, also after 4th or 6th grade when students can transfer to the most prestigious high 
schools (gymnasiums) that admit students into grade 5 or grade 7, as well as the modal admission of 
grade 9. 
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5. SCHOOL SEGREGATION, RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND POLICIES: 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we create an overall picture to better reveal and understand the mechanisms that 
lead to higher or lower levels of between-school segregation of Roma students in Hungarian towns. 
We estimate a statistical model that is structural in the sense that it separates the mechanisms in 
ways that are guided by theory. It is a system of linear regressions that is not structural in the strict 
econometric sense as we do not claim exogenous variation in our explanatory variables. Instead, our 
estimates present associations (conditional on other explanatory variables) that may or may not 
support the presence of the structural theoretical mechanisms in our data.  
As documented herein, there is substantial heterogeneity in the degree of segregation across the 
100 towns in our analysis. The index of segregation varies from zero to 75 per cent, with a mean of 
15 per cent and a standard deviation of 16 percent. Theoretical considerations suggest four 
mechanisms that may explain such heterogeneity. When we describe the mechanisms, we indicate 
variable names that will be used in the regression models. 
First, ethnic school segregation (S) is expected to be large when ethnic residential segregation 
(L) is high. In this case, Roma and non-Roma students filling nearby schools exclusively, leave little 
room for mixing.  
Under the regime of free school choice, school segregation can be high even in the case of low 
residential segregation if students commute between school districts. High levels of commuting 
among higher status students (M for mobility) can result in the unequal ethnic composition of 
schools. Whereas only a quarter of the lower status students are mobile in this respect, 50 per cent 
of the higher status students are enrolled in schools outside the catchment area of their residence. 
As mobile students are usually seeking better schools than those in their own district, the increased 
number of higher status students may suggest that the schools offer either better teachers and 
facilities or better classmates with respect to their status and academic abilities.  
Third, local educational policies (P) practiced over a longer period (through instruments that 
can directly affect the sorting or mixing of students in the local school system) can also impact 
school segregation outcomes.  
Fourth, sorting and the small size of most of our towns are likely to induce a positive correlation 
between the share of Roma students in town (R) and segregation. In small towns with few Roma 
students, even if all Roma students end up in the same school, they will have non-Roma peers; thus 
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they are not completely segregated. Conversely, in small towns with many Roma students, sorting 
may lead to stronger segregation as the number of Roma students can support an all-Roma school.  
The regression implied by these mechanisms assumes the following form (where, as before, 
index j denotes the towns): 
 0 1 2 4 5j j j j j jS L M P R u  
 
Taking one step back in the causal chain, we have three auxiliary equations, all of which 
represent one of the following important transmission mechanisms: (i) the determination of the 
mobility of high status students, (ii) the determination of the local educational policy instruments 
that can directly affect segregation outcomes, or (iii) the determination of the residential 
segregation. Accordingly, the three regressions assume the following forms: 
 0 1 2 3logj j j j jM I L P v  
 0 1 2 3j j j j jP L R A w  
 0 1 2 logj j j jL R N  
 
Table 10 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the model. Because the 
regressions are run without weights, summary statistics are computed without weights, too. The 
unweighted average of the segregation index is lower than the weighted average because smaller 
towns are, on average, less segregated. The unweighted average fraction of Roma students is, on the 
other hand, higher than the weighted average because smaller towns have a higher proportion of 
Roma students. 
Table 11 shows the regression estimates of the coefficients in the equation for between-school 
segregation (S). The table lists the right-hand side variables, the estimated coefficients (β0 through 
β5 plus an additional coefficient for Aj to show that that one is zero), the standard errors, the 
corresponding t-statistics and the p-values of the tests of H0: βk=0. The standard error estimates 
are consistent under heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 10. 
Summary statistics of the variables in the regression model (unweighted means and 
standard deviations; number of observations = 99) 
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. 
S 
Between-school segregation index (source: NABC, 
2010) 
0.14 0.14 
L 
Residential segregation index (source:  100 towns 
survey, 2011 and 2001 census ) 
0.17 0.16 
M 
Percentage of high status (mother’s education = 
general secondary or diploma) attending a school not 
in their own school district (source: NABC, mean 
value of the 2006 to 2010 years) 
0.34 0.17 
P 
Local Educational Policy Index (source: 100 towns 
survey, 2011) 
0.19 0.15 
R 
Percentage of Roma students in the primary grades ( 
1 to 8) (source: NABC, 2010) 
0.14 0.11 
I Number of schools in the town (NABC, 2010) 8 8 
log(I) logarithm of I 1.85 0.68 
N 
Population in the town (in thousands; source: 
TSTAR, 2010) 
2,534  2,764  
log(N) logarithm of N 7.51 0.73 
A 
General Educational Policy Attitude Index (source: 
100 towns survey, 2011) 
0.27 0.25 
 
The last column of the table shows the standardized Beta coefficients that correspond to 
associations measured in standard deviation units. These standardized coefficients are easier to 
interpret than the original regression coefficients because the dependent variable (S) and most of 
the right-hand side variables have no natural unit of measurement. For example, consider the 
standardized coefficient of the policy index P, which shows that towns with a one standard deviation 
higher value for the policy index P are characterized by a between-school segregation index that is 
0.16 higher on average (all other factors being equal). 
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Table 11. 
Results of the main regression model. Dependent variable: S (index of the between-
school segregation); number of observations: 99. R2=0.28 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Beta-
coefficient 
L = residential segregation 0.10 0.12 0.11 
M = mobility 0.27 0.08** 0.31 
P = educational policy index 0.16 0.07* 0.17 
R= proportion of Roma students in the 
town 
0.67 0.12** 0.52 
Constant -0.09 0.04   
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. ** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
“Beta” coefficients are standardized regression coefficients 
 
The results are strong, especially when we consider the size of the sample and the fact that our 
dependent variable and most of our right- hand side variables are measured with considerable 
noise. The association between school segregation and residential segregation (L) is weak. Our point 
estimate reveals a modest correlation, but it is imprecise, and thus, it is not statistically significant. 
At the same time, the association between school segregation and inter-district student mobility (M) 
is strong and highly statistically significant. According to the standardized coefficients, primary 
schools in towns that are characterized by a higher standard deviation with respect to the inter-
district mobility of middle-class students tends to be more segregated by approximately one-third of 
a standard deviation with respect to the segregation index. Local educational policies (P) play a 
smaller though non-negligible role. Policies that are expected to enforce segregation do, indeed, 
lead to higher levels of between-school segregation, though the association is weaker than that with 
mobility. That is, towns that are characterized by a one standard deviation or more with respect 
more segregationist local policies are also characterized by one-sixth of a standard deviation higher 
level of segregation. The strongest association, however, is estimated between segregation and the 
proportion of Roma students in the town (R), with a standardized coefficient of 0.52.  
The estimates of the auxiliary regressions are displayed in Table 12. These estimates uncover 
associations between mobility and policies as well as other right hand-side variables. We also looked 
for associations with residential segregation. The structure of these tables is the same as structure of 
the previous table. 
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Table 12. 
Results of the auxiliary regression models. Number of observations: 99. 
 Dep. var.: M  Dep. var.: P  Dep.var.: L 
 Coeff. S.E. Beta  Coeff. S.E. Beta  Coeff. S.E. Beta 
L -0.09 0.06 -0.09   0.19 0.09* 0.20         
P 0.04 0.07 0.03                 
logI 0.20 0.02** 0.79                 
R         -0.10 0.16 -0.07   0.65 0.16** 0.47 
A         0.13 0.06* 0.22         
Log(N)                 0.02 0.02 0.10 
Constant -0.01 0.03     0.14 0.03**     -0.08 0.14   
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
* Significant at the 5 per cent level. ** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Beta coefficients are standardized regression coefficients 
 
To see the estimates together, Figure 9 shows a path graph of the regression results with the 
estimated standardized coefficients. Pointed links on the graph represent statistically significant 
regression coefficients from the right-hand side variables to left-hand side variables, conditional on 
the other right-hand side variables. Relationships that are not significant are not included in the 
graph. 
Figure 9. 
Results of the regression models  
(beta coefficients from Table 12 and Table 13)  
(
a
 significant at 0.001, 
b
 significant at 0.01, 
c
 significant at 0.05. Insignificant coefficients (paths) are not depicted) 
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We summarize the most important results in the following way. Ethnic segregation of primary 
schools in Hungarian towns and cities is strongly related to the inter-district mobility of higher 
status students and local education policies, as well as the proportion of the Roma population. 
Interestingly, residential segregation has no direct impact on the level of school segregation, 
presumably because inter-district mobility makes actual residence less important under the regime 
of free school choice (and because commuting costs in the towns under analysis are rather 
minimal).  
Inter-district mobility is strongly related to the (log) number of schools. This relationship 
provides evidence of the effect of the size of the educational market on skill-based sorting. 
According to evidence documented by Figure 8, an important reason for that effect may be the fact 
that larger educational markets are associated with greater levels of heterogeneity of schools. 
Local educational policies, as measured by index P, are related to the broad policy context (as 
measured by attitude variable A). That is, the more anti-poor the attitudes, the more segregationist 
the measures taken by the local educational administration. Somewhat surprisingly, the educational 
policy index is not directly related to the proportion of the Roma population in the town, but rather, 
it is related to the degree of the ethnic residential segregation. It seems, therefore, that educational 
policy is more segregationist when the Roma population is concentrated in segregated areas of the 
town, and accordingly, residential segregation of the Roma population is greater if the Roma 
population is relatively large in the town.  
These results are all consistent with our theoretical model for the causes of ethnic segregation 
among Hungarians schools. We outlined the model in section 1 in more detail, and according to our 
argument, the ethnic composition of schools within a town are different primarily because of the 
sorting of students into schools by skills and by broader family background factors. The primary 
school system in Hungary is characterized by free choice, and the commuting costs in most of the 
towns in our analysis are low. Students and their families choose the “best” school in terms of 
prestige and social composition of peers, while school admissions are a result of rationing. The 
primary mechanism behind sorting is commuting or, in other words, the inter-district mobility of 
students. As a result, the role of residential segregation, which could be the strongest source without 
school choice, is greatly diminished by this mechanism. The structural regressions results clearly 
support these implications: inter-district mobility is strongly associated with ethnic segregation, 
while residential segregation is, at most, weakly related. The strongest driving force behind inter-
district mobility is the size of the educational market, which supports our theory of sorting by 
perceived quality and differentiation of schools. 
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Local educational policies can modify the degree of school segregation, and we show a great deal 
of heterogeneity in local educational policies. The sources of that heterogeneity are difficult to 
identify, but our indicators of the broader policy context capture some of those sources. 
Interestingly, residential segregation is associated with educational policies, which may be related 
to more general social norms and attitudes within towns, though this association is speculative. We 
find that the proportion of the Roma population in the town is not associated with the 
segregationist tendencies of local educational policies. This fact supports the argument that the 
primary source of school segregation may not be the direct avoidance of Roma students by non-
Roma families but rather a sorting by perceived school quality and perceived abilities that is made 
possible by school choice and low commuting costs. If this is true, the Roma become the victims of 
the system in an indirect way.  
Our results identify one more important factor that shapes between-school segregation: the 
proportion of the Roma population in the town. Our sorting model implies the existence of such a 
relationship because the number of Roma students in a typical town is less than the capacity of a 
single school. Accordingly, there is an inevitable mixing of Roma and non-Roma students even if all 
Roma students were to attend the same school. However, the magnitude of the estimated 
relationship appears to be too strong to be caused by such a simple mechanism. In fact, the strong 
positive association is likely to reflect mechanisms that are beyond color-blind sorting. In 
particular, ethnicity may be used as a strong signal of student quality in towns that have a higher 
proportion of Roma students. Such a mechanism would introduce a direct ethnic aspect into the 
sorting phenomenon described above, and it can further reinforce the social stigma attributed to 
Roma students. However, the data requirements for disentangling these effects are beyond the 
scope of our analysis. 
Our data and analysis provide strong support for the significant role of inter-district student 
mobility as a major factor contributing to school segregation, while the role of residential 
segregation is weak presumably because of that mobility. We also found that local educational 
policies have a limited but non-negligible role in shaping between-school segregation in Hungarian 
towns. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of our research are centered on the role and the impact of residential segregation and 
local educational policies on school segregation in 100 Hungarian towns. We focused on the ethnic 
segregation of primary schools (grades 1 through 8) and the extent to which Roma and non-Roma 
students attend the same schools and are, therefore, exposed to each other within the school 
environment. We used all available national data to accurately assess school segregation.  
Residential segregation and local educational policies were measured using our own surveys. 
The measurement of the segregationist or integrationist tendencies of local educational policies is a 
major innovation of our study. Using data from questionnaire-based interviews with the heads of 
the municipal educational offices, we constructed ten instruments that each town could use to 
influence, either way, between-school segregation. The data show that, on average, Hungarian 
towns tend to implement educational policies that promote increased between-school segregation 
in addition to that which student mobility would imply. This segregationist tendency is, on average, 
rather moderate. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity across towns, with some towns even 
promoting ethnic distribution across schools, and other towns practicing policies that are 
considerably segregationist. 
Our results indicate that school segregation is moderate in Hungarian towns. The data also 
show that, on average, school segregation within Hungarian towns increased substantially between 
1992 and 2006, decreased from 2006 to 2008 and then increased again thereafter. However, data 
limitations prevent us from identifying robust trends after 2006. 
Using the segregation indices, on the one hand, and the measures of residential segregation, 
student mobility and local education policies, on the other hand, we estimated a statistical model to 
assess the relative importance of the causal mechanisms behind school segregation of the Roma 
students in the 100 Hungarian towns.  
Our results show that school segregation is significantly associated with student mobility, with 
the majority of the Roma population and with local educational policies. These associations hold 
conditional on each other. In other words, for a given share of the Roma population and a given 
educational policy environment, a higher mobility of middle class students is associated with higher 
levels of school segregation. At the same time, for a given level of mobility of middle class students 
and a given educational policy environment, a higher share of Roma students is associated with 
higher levels of school segregation. Finally, for given levels of mobility and Roma representation, 
towns with municipalities that implement segregationist (integrationist) educational policies in 
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their objectives tend to have higher (lower) levels of school segregation. Furthermore and contrary 
to student mobility, residential segregation is not significantly related to school segregation. 
These results are consistent with a simple theory of school choice that includes differentiation in 
the (perceived) quality of schools as well as sorting by ability and family background into schools. 
Our data and analysis provide strong support for the significant role of inter-district student 
mobility as a major justification for school segregation. The role of residential segregation is weak, 
presumably because of the inter-district student mobility. We also demonstrated that local 
educational policies play a limited but non-negligible role in shaping between-school segregation in 
Hungarian towns. 
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Appendix A. The sample 
 
Table A.1. The sample of 100 towns 
Name of city or 
town 
County No. election 
wards 
Estimated fraction 
of Roma students 
No. all 
students 
Ózd Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 40 49.4% 3586 
Tiszavasvári Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 10 35.4% 1374 
Nyírbátor Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 10 34.6% 1629 
Hajdúhadház Hajdú-Bihar 11 34.2% 1674 
Heves Heves 11 29.3% 1153 
Bátonyterenye Nógrád 14 27.0% 1092 
Békés Békés 21 26.9% 1378 
Sajószentpéter Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 10 26.0% 1612 
Sátoraljaújhely Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 22 26.0% 1599 
Balmazújváros Hajdú-Bihar 21 25.1% 1468 
Vásárosnamény Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 8 24.1% 1024 
Edelény Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 10 22.1% 1179 
Salgótarján Nógrád 42 18.6% 3846 
Komló Baranya 32 18.0% 1950 
Siklós Baranya 11 17.7% 1154 
Mezõkövesd Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 17 16.3% 1447 
Miskolc Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 184 15.5% 12134 
Püspökladány Hajdú-Bihar 14 15.4% 1283 
Oroszlány Komárom-Esztergom 19 15.4% 1801 
Kiskunhalas Bács-Kiskun 29 15.0% 2348 
Gyál Pest 10 14.7% 1564 
Monor Pest 15 14.2% 1312 
Mohács Baranya 22 14.1% 1464 
Törökszentmiklós Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 20 13.5% 1810 
Berettyóújfalu Hajdú-Bihar 17 13.2% 1261 
Balassagyarmat Nógrád 19 13.2% 1261 
Bicske Fejér 11 13.1% 1149 
Gyomaendrõd Békés 20 12.5% 1064 
Kisvárda Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 15 12.2% 1813 
Mezõtúr Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 19 12.2% 1388 
Nagyatád Somogy 10 12.0% 1159 
Mátészalka Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 13 11.2% 1623 
Karcag Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 20 11.1% 1750 
Cegléd Pest 35 11.0% 3095 
Esztergom Komárom-Esztergom 27 10.9% 2071 
Sárospatak Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 18 10.8% 1003 
Tatabánya Komárom-Esztergom 67 10.2% 5818 
Nagykõrös Pest 30 10.2% 1827 
Kazincbarcika Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 40 10.0% 2835 
Sárbogárd Fejér 20 10.0% 1195 
Kalocsa Bács-Kiskun 17 9.9% 1421 
Csongrád Csongrád 20 9.4% 1367 
Kaposvár Somogy 54 9.2% 5650 
Siófok Somogy 22 9.0% 1803 
Ráckeve Pest 9 9.0% 1051 
Kiskunfélegyháza Bács-Kiskun 33 8.9% 2476 
Szentes Csongrád 36 8.1% 2495 
Pápa Veszprém 28 7.9% 2614 
Tiszaföldvár Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 10 7.9% 1064 
Szolnok Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 70 7.7% 6364 
Pécs Baranya 160 7.6% 11444 
Makó Csongrád 30 7.5% 1766 
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Table A.1. The final sample of 100 towns, continued 
Name of city or 
town 
County No. election 
wards 
Estimated fraction 
of Roma students 
No. all 
students 
Zalaegerszeg Zala 53 7.5% 4430 
Dombóvár Tolna 22 7.4% 1565 
Szarvas Békés 22 7.4% 1108 
Hódmezõvásárhely Csongrád 60 7.4% 3297 
Kecskemét Bács-Kiskun 92 7.3% 8317 
Nyíregyháza Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 92 7.3% 8183 
Tapolca Veszprém 18 7.1% 1340 
Eger Heves 48 7.0% 5278 
Gödöllõ Pest 23 6.9% 2795 
Körmend Vas 11 6.8% 1235 
Keszthely Zala 20 6.8% 1412 
Újfehértó Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 11 6.7% 1581 
Tata Komárom-Esztergom 24 6.6% 1259 
Jászberény Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 30 6.6% 2206 
Hajdúböszörmény Hajdú-Bihar 29 6.3% 2835 
Dabas Pest 10 6.2% 1336 
Paks Tolna 20 6.0% 1811 
Sárvár Vas 19 5.9% 1372 
Érd Pest 43 5.9% 4220 
Bonyhád Tolna 13 5.8% 1320 
Szekszárd Tolna 34 5.8% 3295 
Ajka Veszprém 31 5.8% 2207 
Hatvan Heves 21 5.7% 1957 
Celldömölk Vas 10 5.4% 1108 
Tiszaújváros Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 18 5.4% 1855 
Baja Bács-Kiskun 37 5.2% 2576 
Vác Pest 28 5.0% 3075 
Gyöngyös Heves 28 4.8% 2060 
Fót Pest 10 4.6% 1455 
Nagykanizsa Zala 48 4.3% 3904 
Dunaharaszti Pest 16 4.3% 1136 
Dorog Komárom-Esztergom 10 4.2% 1176 
Orosháza Békés 40 4.2% 1960 
Dunakeszi Pest 25 4.2% 2088 
Szombathely Vas 67 4.1% 5675 
Várpalota Veszprém 21 4.0% 1697 
Hajdúnánás Hajdú-Bihar 20 3.9% 1455 
Gyõr Gyõr-Moson-Sopron 104 3.7% 9278 
Kõszeg Vas 10 3.7% 1176 
Mór Fejér 11 3.4% 1397 
Békéscsaba Békés 61 3.4% 4381 
Hajdúszoboszló Hajdú-Bihar 20 3.4% 1724 
Szeged Csongrád 129 3.3% 11551 
Székesfehérvár Fejér 87 3.3% 8347 
Szentendre Pest 10 3.3% 2175 
Debrecen Hajdú-Bihar 166 3.2% 15004 
Budaörs Pest 18 3.1% 2015 
Vecsés Pest 20 3.0% 1415 
Mosonmagyaróvár Gyõr-Moson-Sopron 30 3.0% 2039 
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Appendix B. Robustness checks using alternative imputations for 
the missing data on the ethnic composition of schools 
 
 
Table B1. Summary statistics of the variables using alternative imputations (unweighted 
means and standard deviations; number of observations = 99) 
  Imputation 
Variable Description no 1 2 3 
  Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
S 
Between-school segregation 
index (source: NABC, 2010) 
0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.23 
R 
Percentage of Roma 
students in the primary (1-
8) grade students (source: 
NABC, 2010) 
0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 
 
 
Table B2. Results of the structural regression (left hand-side variable: school segregation) 
using alternative imputations 
Dep. var: S Imputation  
  no 1 2 3 
L 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.08 
  [0.12] [0.12] [0.10] [0.16] 
M 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.40 
  [0.08]** [0.08]** [0.07]** [0.13]** 
P 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.10 
  [0.09]+ [0.07]* [0.05]* [0.15] 
R 0.58 0.67 0.69 0.86 
  [0.13]** [0.12]** [0.11]** [0.23]** 
Constant -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.07 
 
[0.04]+ [0.04]* [0.03]** [0.06] 
Observations 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.23 
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Table B3. Results of the structural regression (left hand-side variable: policy) using 
alternative imputations 
Dep. var: P Imputation       
  no 1 2 3 
L 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.24 
  [0.09]* [0.09]* [0.09]* [0.09]** 
R -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.23 
  [0.15] [0.16] [0.16] [0.15] 
A 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
  [0.06]* [0.06]* [0.06]* [0.06]* 
Constant 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
  [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** 
Observations 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 
 
 
 
Table B4. Results of the structural regression (left hand-side variable: residential segreation) 
using alternative imputations 
Dep. var: L Imputation       
  no 1 2 3 
R 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.62 
  [0.15]** [0.16]** [0.16]** [0.13]** 
logN 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Constant -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 
  [0.14] [0.14] [0.15] [0.15] 
Observations 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.2 
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Appendix C 
The definition of the local educational policy instruments 
 
Local Educational Policy Instruments (P): 
 
P1. Closing of schools 
P2. Merger of schools 
P3. Reducing the number of school districts on a large scale 
P4. Merging school districts or modifying school districts’ boundaries 
P5. Changing the school provider: transforming municipal schools into parochial or not for profit private schools 
P6. Admission policies of municipal elite schools 
P7. Ensuring proper representation of Roma students in municipal schools where the proportion of Roma students is low 
P8. Supporting the establishment of new parochial or not for profit private schools 
P9. Intervention against segregation targeting non-municipal schools (to meet Roma proportion benchmarks) 
P10. Policies towards segregated Roma schools 
 
 
Legend: 
 
 In red boxes: Question numbers from the Educational Policy Questionnaire 
 
 Endpoints (from 1 to y) of a given Graph (x) are marked by symbols from ix.1 to ix.y. 
 
 0, 1, or -1 integer values are assigned to the endpoints of the Graphs depending on the attitude/behavior of  the  
educational administration with regard to the local school system: 
 
  endpoint is marked by: 
v = 0: non-activist position (or the instrument is not used) dotted area in the box 
v = 1: segregationist attitude / behavior gray area in the box 
v = -1: integrationist attitude / behavior dashed lines bordering the box 
 
  
nem (0) 
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P1. Closing of schools 
 
 
Have any school been closed down since the 
2005/2006 academic year?1 
i1.1. 
No 
(0) 
Yes 
What happened to the 
students? 
 
i.1.11. 
Closing 
gradually 
(-1) 
rij >40% 
Together to 
another schools 
 
i1.9. 
rfj <25% 
(-1) 
 
In the closed school rij in the moment of the closure 
i1.2. 
rij ≤5% 
(0) 
5%< rij ≤40% 
i1.8. 
rfj>=25% 
(1) 
What happened to the 
students? 
i1.6 
Closing 
gradually 
(0) 
i1.12 
Proportionally 
to other schools 
(-1) 
i1.7. 
Proportionally to 
other schools 
(0) 
Together to 
another schools 
 
Share of Roma students 
in the recipient school 
 
i1.3. 
rfj>=25% 
(1) 
i1.4. 
rfj <25% 
(0) 
i1.5. 
Separated to 
another schools1 
(1) 
i1.10. 
Separated to 
another schools1  
(1) 
Share of Roma students 
in the recipient school 
K1 
School ID – K3a 
Educational policy 
questionnaire 
K5 
K5.3. 
K5.2. 
K5.4. 
K5.5. 
K6.c(b) 
K5.1. K5.3. K5.1. 
K5.2. 
K5.4. 
K5.5. 
K5.2. 
K6.c(b) 
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Notes1: 
 
1 – Separated to another schools: Roma and non-Roma students go separated to recipient schools; or the assignment depends on NABC test results; or 
schools screen the students on the basis of previous school achievement. (NABC: National Assessment of Basic Competences) 
 
 
Documents:  
Resolution on school closing 
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
 
Notation 
rij – share of Roma students in school i in city j 
rfj – share of Roma students in the recipient school in city j 
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P2. Merger of schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i2.1 No 
(0) 
Yes 
(hij-hj)/hj>25% i2.3. 
-25%<(hij-hj)/hj<25% 
(0) 
Proportion of multiple disadvantaged students in the 
incorporated schools before the merger2 
Share of Roma students in 
the central school3 
i2.5. 
rkj<=25%  
(1) 
 
i2.2.  
(hij-hj)/hj<-25% 
 
(0) 
Have any schools been merged since the 2005/2006 academic year?1 
i2.6.  
rkj>25%  
(1) 
Share of Roma students in the 
incorporated schools 
i2.4. 
rij<rj 
(0) 
rij>rj 
K7 
School ID – K9a 
K11b 
K11c K1 c 
NABC 
K12a 
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Notes 2: 
NABC: National Assessment of Basic Competences 
 
1 – School merger: education is continued in the participating schools 
2 — Prerequisite of participation in school integration programs: the proportion of multi-disadvantaged students may differ from the proportion of multi-
disadvantaged students calculated for the whole of the town or village by 25 per cent at most 
3—Central school: usually the larger school which is incorporating another independent school 
 
Documents: 
Resolution on merger of schools,  
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system [Act No. LXXIX of 1993 on Public Education, Article 85 (4)] 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
 
Notation 
hj – share of multiple disadvantaged students in city j 
hij – share of multiple disadvantaged students in school i in city j 
rj – share of Roma students in city j 
rij – share of Roma students in school i in city j 
rkj – share of Roma students in the central school in city j 
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P3. Reducing the number of school districts on a large scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of school districts since the 
2005/2006 academic year… 
i3.1. has not been 
reduced by more 
than 50% 
(0) 
has been reduced by 
more than 50% 
Are there desegregation goals in 
the documents? 
i3.3. No 
(1) 
i3.2. Yes 
(0) 
K29 
K30 (D6a) 
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Notes 3: 
 
 
Documents:  
Resolutions on reducing the number of school districts 
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
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P4. Merging school districts or modifying school districts’ boundaries 
  
 
 
  
Have school districts been modified/merged since the 
2005/2006 academic year? 
i4.1. No 
(0) 
Yes 
Meeting the 
requirements of the 
Act on Public 
Education, Article 66 
Any supporting program? 
 School enrollment campaign 
 Open days in the low-prestige schools 
 Forum for parents 
 Restricting the number of students whose domicile is in different 
school district by administrative means  
What was the reason of it?  
i4.4.  
Big changes in the 
number of students  
(0) 
i4.5 
Closing of 
schools 
(0) 
i4.6.  
Adjusting district 
boundaries to real 
attendance data 
(1) 
i4.3.No 
(-1) 
i4.2. Yes 
(-1) 
i4.7. 
Homogenization of 
mixed districts 
(1) 
K31 
K35 (D7a) 
D7a1 D7a4 D7a2 
D7a3 
D7a5 
K36 (D7b) 
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Notes 4: 
 
 
Explanations:  
-- Adjusting district boundaries to real attendance data: adjusting school district boundaries with regard to inter-district mobility of students 
-- Meeting the requirements of Act on Public Education, Article 66: „If there are more primary schools operating in the village or town, the proportion of 
multi-disadvantaged students calculated for each school may not exceed the proportion of multi-disadvantaged students calculated for the whole of the 
town or village by more than 25 per cent.” 
 
Documents:  
Resolution on modifying school districts,  
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education, 
Documents on the supporting programs 
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P5. Changing the school provider: transforming municipal schools into parochial or not for profit private schools 
 
 
 
 
Has any municipal school been transformed into parochial or not for 
profit private school since the 2005/2006 academic year? 
i5.1 No 
(0) 
Yes 
Share of Roma students before the 
change of control 
rij ≤5% 5%< rij ≤40% rij >40% 
i5.8. 
Without PEC 
(1) 
 
With PEC 
i5.9. 
Without 
mentioning  
r- (rij → rj) 
(1) 
i5.3 
Mentioning 
r+ (rij → rj) 
(-1) 
i5.4  
Without 
mentioning 
r+ (rij → rj) 
(1) 
i5.5.  
Without PEC 
(1) 
 
With PEC i5.2 
Without PEC 
(1) 
With PEC 
i5.6. 
Maintaining the 
current level of 
rij is mentioned 
(0) 
i5.7. 
Maintaining the 
current level of 
rij is not 
mentioned 
(1) 
i5.10 
Mentioning 
r- (rij → rj) 
(1) 
K13 
School ID (K15a) 
K16c 
K18 
D3c 
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Notes 5: 
 
PEC: public education contract (contract between the educational provider and the local administration responsible for the operation of the local school 
system) 
 
Documents:  
The local council’s resolution on the transformation of the municipal school  
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
Contracts with the educational providers (PEC-s) 
 
Notation 
rij – share of Roma students in school i in city j 
rj – share of Roma students in city j 
r+ – increasing the share of Roma students, integration 
r- – decreasing the share of Roma students, integration 
(rij → rj) – convergence of the share of Roma students to the town’s average 
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P6. Admission policies of municipal elite schools 
 
 
 
 
Is there any municipal school in the town where the number of 
applicants was exceptionally high in the last 5 years? 
i6.1. 
No 
(0) 
Yes 
How does this school screen the 
applicants?1 
i6.3  
First-come,  
first-admitted basis, 
or other neutral 
rules  
(0) 
i6.7.  
Admission based on 
skills or test scores  
(1) 
i6.4  
Not skill based 
priorities2 
(1) 
i6.6. 
Admission 
based on 
interviews 
(1) 
i6.2.  
Preference for 
disadvantaged 
students + lottery4 
(-1) 
i6.5 
Kindergarten-
School path3 
(1) 
i6.8.  
Lottery (but no 
preference for 
disadvantaged 
students)4 
(1) 
K41 
School ID – K43a 
K44 
K44.7. 
K44.6. 
K44.5. K44.4. 
K44.2. K44.1. 
K44.2. 
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Notes 6:  
 
 
1 – In the case of multiple screening code the highest.  
2 – Not skill based priorities: Decision made by the school headmaster; not skill based selection (e.g.: brother/sister is in the school, parents work near to the 
school, etc.) 
3 – Kindergarten-school path: the admission is an automatically ensured from certain kindergarten 
4 - Act No. LXXIX of 1993 on Public Education, Article 66: “If a primary school cannot grant all the applications for admission due to lack space according to 
the given order, they decide between the applicants belonging to the group affected by drawing lots.” 
 
 
Documents:  
Documents on the selection forms,  
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
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P7.Ensuring proper representation of Roma students in municipal schools where the proportion of Roma students is low 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Is there any municipal school where 
(hij-hj)/hj<-25% ? 
i7.1. 
No 
(0) 
Yes 
What do you do to increase hij? 
i7.2.  
Programs for enhancing proper  
representation of Roma students 
 School enrollment campaigns 
 Administrative means (e.g.: restricting the  
number of students whose domicile is in 
different school district ) 
(-1) 
Nem, az 
elzárkózott 
ettől (0) 
igen igen 
nem (0.75) 
i7.3.  
Nothing, it depends on the decision of the 
parents 
(1) 
K60 – School datasheet row 25-26. (27) 
School ID – K60 
D14/K62 
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Notes 7: 
 
Documents:  
Local council resolution (draft resolution) on the programs 
Programs reports 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
 
Notation: 
hj – share of multiple disadvantaged students in city j 
hij – share of multiple disadvantaged students in school i in city j 
 
 
  
63 
 
P8. Supporting the establishment of new parochial or not for profit private schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Did the local council support                                    
the  establishment of this school? 
With PEC 
Has any new non-municipal school been 
established in the last five years? 
i8.1. No 
(0) 
i8.3. 
Without PEC 
(1) 
KM nincs 
(0) 
i8.4.  
The target level of         
rij (rij ≈ rj) is mentioned 
 (1) 
 
i8.5.  
The target level of         
rij (rij ≈ rj) is not 
mentioned 
 (1) 
 
Yes 
i8.2 No 
(0) 
Yes 
K20 
School ID – K22a 
K24 (D4) 
K23 
D4c 
nem (0) 
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Notes 8: 
 
Documents:  
PEC: public education contract (contract between the educational provider and the local administration responsible for the operation of the local school 
system) 
Resolution/draft resolution on the support/financial aid of the new parochial or not for profit private school 
 
 
Notation: 
rij – share of Roma students in school i in city j 
rj – share of Roma students in city j 
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P9. Intervention against segregation targeting non-municipal schools (to meet Roma proportion benchmarks) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is there any non-municipal school where 
(rij-rj)/rj <-25%  or  (rij-rj)/rj >25%? 
Or in case of lack of data on rij 
(hij-hj)/hj <-25%  or  (hij-hj)/hj >25%? 
Is a PEC made/modified to ensure proper representation  
  of Roma students in the school? 
(rij ≈ rj) or (hij ≈ hj) 
No Yes 
i9.4.  
No, the local council 
did not want to make 
a PEC 
 (1) 
i9.5. 
Yes 
(-1) 
i9.3.  
No, the school 
provider refused to 
make a PEC 
(0) 
Nem, az 
elzárkózott 
ettől (0) 
igen igen 
nem (0.75) 
Is this claim supported 
by statistical data? 
i9.1. 
Yes 
(0) 
i9.2. 
No 
(1) 
School ID - K25c/K26a 
K25c/K26a 
K25d/K26b 
K25d.2. 
K26b.2 
School datasheet row 25-28.  
NABC 
K25d.3. 
K26b.3 
K25d.1. 
K26b.1 
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Notes 9: 
 
 
Documents:  
PEC-s: public education contracts (contracts between the educational providers and the local administration responsible for the operation of the local school 
system) 
 
 
Notation: 
hj – share of multiple disadvantaged students in city j 
hij – share of multiple disadvantaged students in school i city j 
rij – share of Roma students in school i in city j 
rj – share of Roma students in city j 
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P10. Policies towards segregated Roma schools 
 
 
 
  
Is there any school for the Roma in the town?1 
Do you plan to close this 
school? 
Yes 
i10.9. The 
operation costs 
are above the 
city average 
(1) 
How? 
i10.2. Students 
proportionally to 
other schools 
(-1) 
i10.3. Closing 
gradually 
(-1) 
i10.6. Incorporated as an 
independent unit into 
another school, 
education is continued 
(1) 
 
No 
i10.8. The 
operation costs are 
below/around the 
city average 
(1) 
Students together to 
other schools 
 
share of Roma students in 
the recipient school 
Is it an ethnic minority school? 
i10.5. 
 rfj ≥ 25% 
(1) 
i10.4.  
rfj <25% 
(-1) 
 
i10.1. 
No 
(0) 
Yes 
i10.7.  
Yes 
(0) 
No 
K63 (School datasheet row 28.) 
School ID –K63 
K65 
K66 
School datasheet 
row 36. 
K66, K67 (D15) 
K67.4. K67.1. K66.a (1) K67.3. 
K68; School datasheet row 28. 
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Notes 10: 
 
1 – “School for the Roma”: share of Roma students is over 40% 
 
Documents:  
Resolution on closing the Roma school 
Council action plan for operating and developing a network of institutions 
Founding charter of the ethnic minority school 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
 
Notation: 
rfj – share of Roma students in the recipient school in city j 
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Analysis and assessment of municipal documents: stereotypes, panels, linguistic clichés 
 
1. Segregationist attitude/goals 
 Prejudices, stereotypes, generalizations against Roma/multiple disadvantaged students; 
 Emphasising of cultural differences between the Roma and majority population; 
 Emphasising cultural conflicts; 
 Identifying Roma/multiple disadvantaged students with bad social/family background; 
 Identifying Roma/multiple disadvantaged students with students who hinder the others in  
 learning; 
 Treating Roma/multiple disadvantaged students as homogeneous group and indentifying them  
 with low-ability students; 
 Arguments for the development of segregated institutions; emphasizing the achievements,  
 results of the segregated institutions; 
 
2. Emphasising separation interests of the majority 
 Students have the right to receive education and teaching in compliance with their abilities 
 Progress/improvement of schools are hindered by low-ability/behavior/socialization of certain  
 students 
 Supporting ability tracking; 
 Supporting tracking on the basis of motivation, diligence. Sentences with “who do not want to  
 learn...” 
 Referring to the middle class flight; 
 
3. Integrationist/desegregationist attitude/goals 
 The proportion of Roma/multiple disadvantaged students calculated for each school district  
 should be around the proportion of Roma/multiple disadvantaged students calculated for the  
 whole of the city; 
 Providing equal access to quality education; 
 Emphasizing the role of education in equalizing the opportunities; 
 Multiculturalism, integrated education;  
 Dangers of segregation;  
 Equal opportunities; 
 Causes of failures: structural causes as opposed to blaming the poor and Roma pupils/families 
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4. Hidden (implicit) segregationist attitude combined with explicit integrationist goals 
 
 Treating Roma students as homogeneous group and supporting different education on the  
 basis of students’ ability 
 Emphasizing the special characteristics of Roma students and the competencies (special  
 pedagogical knowledge) which are needed for their education 
 Generalization against Roma parents, condemnation; 
 Using integration in a narrow manner (“first it is necessary to be able for integration”, etc.)  
 Romology, Roma-pedagogy, Roma minority education as primary approach 
 Causes of failures: family background, motivation, social environment, “inner” causes 
 Emphasizing biological differences (“early/premature growing”, etc.) 
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Appendix D 
 
The definition of the general policy attitudes measures of the local educational administration with 
respect to equal opportunities 
 
Policy attitudes measures (A) 
 
A1. Restricting the practice of exceedingly classifying students into SEN
1
 status  
A2. Classifying students into “home-schooled” status2  
A3. Preventing poor children from being crowded out of kindergarten in case of short supply in facilities 
A4. Encouraging participation of Roma children in kindergartens 
A5. Neglecting the problem of registration of students with “multiple disadvantages” 
 
 
Legend: 
 In red boxes: Question numbers from the Educational Policy Questionnaire 
 
 Endpoints (from 1 to y) of a given Graph (x) are marked by symbols from ix.1 to ix.y. 
 
 0, 1, or -1 integer values are assigned to the endpoints of the Graphs depending on the attitude/behavior of  the  
educational administration with regard to equal opportunities: 
 
  endpoint is marked by: 
v = 0: neutral position (or irrelevant issue in the town) dotted area in the box 
v = 1: neglecting equal opportunities gray area in the box 
v = -1: enhancing equal opportunities dashed lines bordering the box 
 
  
                                                          
1
 SEN = special educational needs 
2
  Home-schooled students are exempted from all compulsory classes at school. Certain schools try to get rid of overage or difficult -to-manage children this way.  
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A1: Restricting the practice of exceedingly classifying students into SEN
3
 status  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
3
 SEN = special educational needs 
What do you do to reduce the exceeding classification of 
students into SEN status? 
i11.1. Programs 
 Checkup/reexamination of the status 
of SEN students 
 Assessing environmental causes/risks 
 Kindergarten programs for improving 
skills of the children 
 Grants 
 (-1) 
i11.3. 
Nothing  
(1) 
i11.2. 
Nothing, the share of SEN 
students is not high in the town 
(0) 
K80 
K80a 
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Notes 1: 
 
Documents:  
Resolution(s) on the programs 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
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A2: Classifying students into “home-schooled” status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Is the proportion of “home-schooled” students in 
your town higher than the national average?  
i13.2.  
Documents reveal 
preferences for 
reduction of overly 
frequent use of 
homeschooling1 
(-1) 
Yes 
i13.6.  
Don’t know 
(1) 
No, it is the competence 
 of the schools 
Is it a problem your administration should handle? 
Was it on your agenda? 
i13.3.  
Documents reveal 
preferences for 
improvement of 
“home-schooled” 
students’ education2  
(1) 
Is there a cooperation between the 
schools and the child welfare service? 
i13.5. 
No 
(1) 
Arányok a fogadó iskolában 
i13.1. 
No 
(0) 
Yes 
i13.4. 
Yes 
(1) 
K51 
NABC 
K53 
K55 K54 (D11) 
D11a D11b 
K55 (1,2) K55 (3,4) 
i13.7. Neither 
(0) 
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Notes 2: 
 
NABC: National Assessment of Basic Competences 
 
1 – Examples: in-service training of teachers, improving cooperation with parents/NGOs; Roma mentor, etc. 
2 – Improvement of “home-schooled” student’s education. This can drive the increase of the number of “home-schooled” students. 
 
Documents:  
Resolution(s) on the programs dealing with private students 
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
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A3: Preventing poor children from being crowded out of kindergarten in case of short supply in facilities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on statistics, are kindergarten places  
in the town in short supply? 
Yes 
Number of children who cannot enroll because of shortage of places ? 
i16.3  
Already having 
financial 
sources 
(-1) 
Is there any plan to create new kindergarten places? 
i16.6. No, there are other 
priorities/the running costs 
are too high 
(1) 
i16.7.  
No, “parents do 
not need them” 
(1) 
i16.4.  
Applying for 
financial support 
(-1) 
i16.5. Have not applied 
for financial support yet 
(-1) 
According to the interviewee? 
   
i16.1. 
No 
(0) 
Yes 
i16.2. 
No 
(1) 
Yes 
K38a/K38b 
K37 
K40 
K39 
K39.3. 
K39.4. 
K39.2. 
K40.3. 
K40.4. 
K40.1. 
K40.2. 
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Notes 3: 
 
Documents:  
Council action plan for operating and developing the local school system 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education, 
Plans, tenders on enlargement/development of kindergartens 
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A4: Encouraging participation of Roma children in kindergartens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low participation of Roma 
children in kindergartens1? 
i17.4. 
No 
(0) 
i17.2.  
No, “it is 
hopeless” 
(1) 
i17.1.  
Yes: 
 Enrollment program 
 Employing persons responsible for 
enhancing the participation of Roma 
children 
 Cooperation with family assistance 
service, minority council 
 Grants 
 Popularization of the kindergarten 
enrollment aid2 
(-1) 
Any program or initiative to 
solve this problem? 
No 
Based on statistics, is their 
participation low? 
i17.3. 
Yes 
(1) 
Yes 
K59 (D13) K38.1/K38.2 < 0.9 
K58 
K59.2. 
D13 
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Notes 4: 
 
1 – Low participation of Roma children in kindergartens: a) low enrollment rate before the age of 5,  b) absentism 
2 – Kindergarten enrollment aid: a nationwide conditional cash transfer program, introduced in January 2009 
 
Documents:  
Documents on programs/initiatives,  
Council action plan for operating and developing a network of the local school system 
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education,  
Plans, tenders on enlargement/development of kindergartens 
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 A5: Neglecting the problem of registration of students with “multiple disadvantages” 
 
 
 
Based on statistics, is it likely that many students with 
multiple disadvantages are not registered? 
i18.1. 
No 
(0) 
According to the interviewee? 
i18.3. Yes, more 
than one 
(-1) 
i18.4. Yes, one 
(-1) 
What do you do to solve this problem? 
 Information campaign about the benefits if disadvantaged status is 
registered 
 Organized registration 
 Cooperation with family assistance service, minority council, schools 
 Other: … 
i18.2.  
No 
(1) 
Yes 
Yes 
i18.5.No  
(1) 
NABC: mothers with low education, 
multiple disadvantaged students 
K56 
K57 (D12) 
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Notes 5: 
 
NABC: National Assessment of Basic Competences 
 
Documents:  
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education,  
Local council resolution (draft resolution) on the programs 
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Analysis and assessment of municipal documents: stereotypes, panels, linguistic clichés 
 
1. Segregationist attitude/goals 
 Prejudices, stereotypes, generalizations against Roma/multiple disadvantaged students; 
 Emphasising of cultural differences between the Roma and majority population; 
 Emphasising cultural conflicts; 
 Identifying Roma/multiple disadvantaged students with bad social/family background; 
 Identifying Roma/multiple disadvantaged students with students who hinder the others in  
 learning; 
 Treating Roma/multiple disadvantaged students as homogeneous group and indentifying them  
 with low-ability students; 
 Arguments for the development of segregated institutions; emphasizing the achievements,  
 results of the segregated institutions; 
 
2. Emphasising separation interests of the majority 
 Students have the right to receive education and teaching in compliance with their abilities 
 Progress/improvement of schools are hindered by low-ability/behavior/socialization of certain  
 students 
 Supporting ability tracking; 
 Supporting tracking on the basis of motivation, diligence. Sentences with “who do not want to  
 learn...” 
 Referring to the middle class flight; 
 
3. Integrationist/desegregationist attitude/goals 
 The proportion of Roma/multiple disadvantaged students calculated for each school district  
 should be around the proportion of Roma/multiple disadvantaged students calculated for the  
 whole of the city; 
 Providing equal access to quality education; 
 Emphasizing the role of education in equalizing the opportunities; 
 Multiculturalism, integrated education;  
 Dangers of segregation;  
 Equal opportunities; 
 Causes of failures: structural causes as opposed to blaming the poor and Roma pupils/families 
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4. Hidden (implicit) segregationist attitude combined with explicit integrationist goals 
 
 Treating Roma students as homogeneous group and supporting different education on the  
 basis of students’ ability 
 Emphasizing the special characteristics of Roma students and the competencies (special  
 pedagogical knowledge) which are needed for their education 
 Generalization against Roma parents, condemnation; 
 Using integration in a narrow manner (“first it is necessary to be able for integration”, etc.)  
 Romology, Roma-pedagogy, Roma minority education as primary approach 
 Causes of failures: family background, motivation, social environment, “inner” causes 
 Emphasizing biological differences (“early/premature growing”, etc.) 
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EDUCATIONAL POLICY RESEARCH 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Town:  ......................................................................................................  ID:   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
START OF INTERVIEW: 
 2011.  ................ month  ...........  day  ................  hour  ............. min 
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I. CHANGE OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS BETWEEN THE 2005/06 – 
2010/11 ACADEMIC YEARS 
 
1. CLOSING OF SCHOOLS 
 
 
 
k1. Have any school been closed down since the 2005/2006 academic year? (according to the Closed schools 
worksheet) 
 
 
 
 
 
1  –  Yes 
 
 
 
2  –  No    
 
 
k2. How many schools have been closed? 
 
 
 
 
                 school(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Go to k7 
Fill out new section for every closed down school!  
In the questionnaire you find enough space for only a few cases. For more cases 
use supplementary sheets! 
Important: Every case is about only one closure! 
Cross-check with the Closed schools worksheet! 
CLOSED SCHOOLS WORKSHEET! 
For every closed down school where the 
education is stopped! 
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1. CASE, CLOSING OF SCHOOLS 
k3. a. Please, give some details of the closure! 
 
a. 
Closed 
school, 
 
 ID number 
b. 
Address 
c. 
Last year of the 
education? 
d. 
Replacement school(s)? 
ID number Short name! Address 
  
……/…… 
academic year 
   
   
   
   
   
 
k4. a. What was the reason behind the decision to close the school? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
Because of the different educational programs of schools the transition can be complicated. 
k5. a. What was the mechanism of the assignment of students to new school(s) in this case? 
1  –  closing gradually  
2  –  together to another school,  
3  –  proportionally to other schools (multiple disadvantaged students and other students are assigned 
proportionally) 
4  –  the assignment depends on test results, skills 
5  –  screening the applicants 
 
k6. a. IF THE STUDENTS OF THE CLOSED SCHOOL REPLACED TOGETHER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL!  
(k5. a.=2) 
About what percentage of students in the replacement school was SEN/multiple disadvantaged/Roma/high ability 
student before the closure? Do you remember the proportion of these certain group of students? 
 
a. SEN students? % 
b. Multiple disadvantaged students? % 
c. Roma students? % 
d. High ability students? % 
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2. CASE, CLOSING OF SCHOOLS 
k3. b. Please, give some details of the closure! 
 
a. 
Closed 
school, 
 
 ID number 
b. 
Address 
c. 
Last year of 
education? 
d. 
Replacement school(s)? 
ID number Short name! Address 
  
……/…… 
academic year 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
k4. b. What was the reason behind the decision to close the school? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
Because of the different educational programs of schools the transition can be complicated. 
k5. b. What was the mechanism of the assignment of students to new school(s) in this case? 
1  –  closing gradually  
2  –  together to another school,  
3  –  proportionally to other schools (multiple disadvantaged students and other students are assigned 
proportionally) 
4  –  the assignment depends on test results, skills 
5  –  screening the applicants 
 
k6. b. IF THE STUDENTS OF THE CLOSED SCHOOL REPLACED TOGETHER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL!  
(k5. b.=2) 
About what percentage of students in the replacement school was SEN/multiple disadvantaged/Roma/high ability 
student before the closure? Do you remember the proportion of these certain group of students? 
 
a. SEN students? % 
b. Multiple disadvantaged students? % 
c. Roma students? % 
d. High ability students? % 
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DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Resolution on school closing    
    
Case 1: 
Write the name here! 
1 2  
  
Case 2: 1 2  
  
Council action plan for operating and developing 
the local school system 
   
    
Case 1: 1 2  
  
Case 2: 1 2  
  
Action plan of equal opportunities in public 
education 
   
    
Case 1: 1 2  
  
Case 2: 1 2  
  
Other:   
  
Case 1: 1 2  
  
Case 2: 1 2   
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2. MERGER OF SCHOOLS  
 
 
 
 
k7. Have any schools been merged since the 2005/2006 academic year?  
 
 
 
 
 
1  –  yes 
 
 
 
2  –  no    
 
 
k8. How many cases are there? 
 
 
 
 
 
                 cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GO TO k13 
Fill out new section for every merger!  
In the questionnaire you find enough space for only a few cases. For more cases 
use supplementary sheets! 
Important: Every case is about only one merger! 
Cross-check with the WORKSHEET! 
WORKSHEET! 
FOR EVERY INCORPORATED SCHOOL WHERE THE 
EDUCATION IS CONTINUED! 
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1. CASE, MERGER OF SCHOOLS 
 
k9. a. Please, give some details of the merger! 
 
a. 
Incorporated 
school, 
 
 ID number 
b. 
Address 
c. 
Year of the 
merger? 
d. 
Host school(s)? 
ID number Short name! Address 
  
……/…… 
academic year 
   
   
   
   
   
 
k10. a. What was the reason behind the decision of the merger of these schools?  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
k11. a. About what percentage of students in the incorporated school was SEN/multiple disadvantaged/Roma/high 
ability student before the merger? Do you remember the share of these certain group of students? 
 
a. SEN students? % 
b. Multiple disadvantaged students? % 
c. Roma students? % 
d. High ability students? % 
 
k12. a. About what percentage of students in the host school was SEN/multiple disadvantaged/Roma/high ability 
student before the merger?  
 
a. SEN students? % 
b. Multiple disadvantaged students? % 
c. Roma students? % 
d. High ability students? % 
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2. CASE, MERGER OF SCHOOLS 
 
k9. b. Please, give some details of the merger! 
 
a. 
Incorporated 
school, 
 
 ID number 
b. 
Address 
c. 
Year of the 
merger? 
d. 
Host school(s)? 
ID number 
 
 
  
……/…… 
academic year 
   
   
   
   
   
 
k10. b. What was the reason behind the decision of the merger of these schools? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
k11. b. About what percentage of students in the incorporated school was SEN/multiple disadvantaged/Roma/high 
ability student before the merger? Do you remember the share of these certain group of students? 
 
a. SEN students? % 
b. Multiple disadvantaged students? % 
c. Roma students? % 
d. High ability students? % 
 
k12. b. About what percentage of students in the host school was SEN/multiple disadvantaged/Roma/high ability 
student before the merger? 
 
a. SEN students? % 
b. Multiple disadvantaged students? % 
c. Roma students? % 
d. High ability students? % 
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DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting for 
it 
Received 
Resolution on merger of schools      
Case 1: 
Write the name here! 
1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Council action plan for operating and developing the 
local school system 
     
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education     
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Other:     
Case 1: 1 2     
Case 2: 1 2     
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3. CHANGING OF SCHOOL PROVIDER 
 
 
 
k13. Has any municipal school been transformed into parochial or not for profit private school since the 2005/2006 
academic year?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  –  Yes 
 
 
 
 
2  –  No    
 
 
k14. How many such transformation are there? 
 
 
 
 
 
                 cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GO TO k20 
Fill out new section for every case!  
In the questionnaire you find enough space for only a few cases. For more cases 
use supplementary sheets! 
Important: Every case is about only one changing of school provider! 
EVERY CASE! 
Consider only changes where municipal school has been 
transformed into parochial or not for profit private school. 
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1. CASE, CHANGING OF SCHOOL PROVIDER 
 
k15. Please, give some details of the transformation! 
 
a. 
ID number of the 
school 
b. 
Address 
c. 
Year of the 
transformation? 
  
……/…… 
academic year 
 
k16. About what percentage of students in this school was SEN/multiple disadvantaged/Roma/high ability student 
before the transformation? Do you remember the proportion of these certain group of students? 
 
a. SEN students? % 
b. Multiple disadvantaged students? % 
c. Roma students? % 
d. High ability students? % 
 
k17. Can you summarize in a few words what was the goal of the transformation? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
k18. Did you make a public education contract with the new educational providers? 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No 
 
k19.  Please tell me on a score of 1-5 how much has the municipality‘s expectation about the changing of school 
provider realized? (5 = absolutely, 1 = not at all) 
 
not at all  absolutely  
1 2 3 4 5  
 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Type 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Relevant public education contracts (PEC) 
1 2     
The local council’s resolution on the transformation 
of the municipal school 
1 2     
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4. ESTABLISHMENT OF NON-MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS 
 
 
 
 
k20. Has any new non-municipal school been established since the 2005/2006 academic year? (The question is not 
on changing of school provider!) 
 
1  –  Yes 
 
 
 
2  –  No    
 
 
k21.  How many non-municipal schools have been established? 
 
 
 
 
 
                 school(s) 
 
 
 
 
EVERY CASE! 
GO TO k25.a. 
Fill out new section for every case!  
In the questionnaire you find enough space for only a few cases. For more cases 
use supplementary sheets! 
Important: Every section is about only one case! 
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1. CASE, ESTABLISHMENT OF NON-MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS 
 
k22. a. Please, give some details of the establishment! 
 
a. 
ID number of the 
school 
b. 
Address 
c. 
First year of 
education? 
  
……/…… academic 
year 
 
k23.  a. Did you make a public education contract with the educational providers?  
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No 
 
k24.  a. Did the local council support the establishment of this school with…? 
1  –  financial support (operation costs) 
2  –  providing building  
3  –  discount rent of school building 
4  –  financial support for investments 
 
2. CASE, ESTABLISHMENT OF NON-MUNICIPALITY SCHOOLS 
 
k22. b. Please, give some details of the establishment! 
 
a. 
ID number of the 
school 
b. 
Address 
c. 
First year of 
education? 
  
……/…… academic 
year 
 
k23.  b. Did you make a public education contract with the educational providers?  
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No 
 
k24.  b. Did the local council support the establishment of this school with…?  
 
1  –  financial support (operation costs) 
2  –  providing building  
3  –  preferential rent of school building 
4  –  financial support for investments 
 
 
DOCUMENTS 
Type 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Relevant public education contracts (PEC)      
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Resolution/draft resolution on the support/financial aid 
of the new parochial or not for profit private school 
    
Case 1: 1 2    
MULTPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWD! 
MULTPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWD! 
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Case 2: 1 2     
 
 
5. COOPERATION WITH NON-MUNICIPAL SCHOOLS 
 
There are cities where most of the high-ability and/or well-to-do students study in non-municipal schools, so municipal 
public schools have to deal with the education of disadvantaged students (SEN, multiple disadvantaged, Roma 
students). On the other hand in some cases non-municipal schools try to enroll these groups of disadvantaged 
students. 
 
k25. a. Is there any non-municipal school in the town where the proportion of high ability students is significantly 
different (higher or lower) from the average of the town? If there are more than three such schools, please, 
consider those three schools where the difference is the greatest. 
 
0 – there is no such school  
 
Proportion of 
high ability 
students: 
1  –  higher 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
2  –  lower 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
 
 
k25.  b. Did you make/modify a public education contract with the educational providers to ensure proper 
representation of high ability students (to converge their proportion to the average of the town) in the 
school? 
 
 
 
 
ID number 
Did you make/modify a 
public education contract? 
Does the contract explicitly refer to 
this group? 
Year of 
the 
contract 
1. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
2. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
3. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
EVERY CASE! 
CHECK THE WORKSHEET! 
GO TO k25. c. 
GO TO THE NEXT! 
GO TO THE NEXT! 
GO TO THE NEXT! 
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k25. c. Is there any non-municipal school in the town where the proportion of Roma students is significantly different 
(higher or lower) from the average of the town? If there are more than three such schools, please, consider 
those three schools where the difference is the greatest! 
 
0  –  there is no such school  
 
Proportion of 
Roma 
students: 
1  –  higher 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
2  –  lower 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
 
 
k25.  d. Did you make/modify a public education contract with the educational providers to ensure proper 
representation of Roma students (to converge their proportion to the average of the town) in the school? 
 
 
 
 
ID number 
Did you make/modify a 
public education contract? 
Does the contract explicitly refer to 
this group? 
Year of 
the 
contract 
1. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
2. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
3. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
 
  
GO TO k26. a. 
GO TO THE NEXT! 
GO TO THE NEXT! 
GO TO THE NEXT! 
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k26. a. Is there any non-municipal school in the town where the proportion of multiple disadvantaged students is 
significantly different (higher or lower) from the average of the town? If there are more than three such schools, 
please, consider those three schools where the difference is the greatest!  
 
 
 
0  –  there is no such school  
 
 
 
 
Proportion of 
multiple 
disadvantaged 
students: 
1  –  higher 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
2  –  lower 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
ID number of the school:                 Address: 
 
 
k26.  b. Did you make/modify a public education contract with the educational providers to ensure proper 
representation of multiple disadvantaged students (to converge their proportion to the average of the town) 
in the school? 
 
 
 
 
ID number 
Did you make/modify a 
public education contract? 
Does the contract explicitly refer to 
this group? 
Year of 
the 
contract 
1. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
2. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
3. School 
 1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, the provider refused 
3  –  No, because of other 
reason 
1  –  Yes 
0  –  No, 
because:………………………………
…………………………………………
…………………………………………
………………… 
 
 
  
GO TO THE DOCUMENTS 
OR TO k27 
CHECK THE WORKSHEET! 
 
GO TO NEXT! 
GO TO NEXT! 
GO TO THE NEXT! 
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DOCUMENTS 
 
Type 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting for 
it 
Received 
Relevant public education contracts (PEC)      
ID number of the school: 1 2     
ID number of the school: 1 2    
ID number of the school: 1 2    
Other:      
ID number of the school: 1 2    
ID number of the school: 1 2    
ID number of the school: 1 2     
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6. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS ON A LARGE SCALE 
 
 
 
k27. How many school districts are there in the town at the moment? 
 
 
                district(s) 
 
 
k28. How many school districts were there in the town in the 2005/06 academic year? 
 
 
                 district(s) 
 
 
k29. Was there any change since the 2005/2006 academic year when the number of school districts has been 
reduced by more than 50%? 
 
1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No    
 
 
k30. What was the reason of this change?X 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Resolutions on reducing the number of school districts 
1 2     
Council action plan for operating and developing the 
local school system 
1 2     
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
1 2    
Other: 
1 2    
 
EVERY CASE! 
GO TO k31 
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7. MERGING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OR MODIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ 
BOUNDARIES 
 
 
 
 
k31. Have school districts been significantly modified/merged since the 2005/2006 academic year (beyond the 
previous changes)? 
 
 
 
 
 
1  –  yes 
 
 
 
2  –  no    
 
 
 
k32. How many significant modifying/merger have been in the town? 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
Beyond the previous transformation on a large scale! 
GO TO k37 
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1. CASE, MERGING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OR MODIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ BOUNDARIES 
 
k33.  a. Which school(s) were involved? 
 
School(s) 
ID number Short name Address 
   
   
   
   
   
 
k34. a. Before what academic year did it happen? 
 
………./………. academic year 
 
k35. a. What was the reason of it?X 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
k36. a. Modifying school districts in itself do not change the school choice decision of parents. Did you support these 
decisions with any programs? 
 
1  –  Yes k36a.a.  What were these programs? X 
 
 .........................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................  
2  –  No  
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2. CASE, MERGING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OR MODIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ BOUNDARIES 
 
k33.  b. Which school(s) were involved? 
 
School(s) 
ID number ID number ID number 
   
   
   
   
   
 
k34. b. Before what academic year did it happen? 
 
………./………. academic year 
 
k35. b. What was the reason of it?X 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
k36. b. Modifying school districts in itself do not change the school choice decision of parents. Did you support these 
decisions with any programs? 
 
1  –  Yes k36b.a.  What were these programs? X 
 
 .........................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................  
2  –  No  
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3. CASE, MERGING SCHOOL DISTRICTS OR MODIFYING SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ BOUNDARIES 
 
k33.  c. Which school(s) were involved? 
 
School(s) 
ID number ID number ID number 
   
   
   
   
   
 
k34. c. Before what academic year did it happen? 
 
………./………. academic year 
 
k35. c. What was the reason of it?X 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
k36. c. Modifying school districts in itself do not change the school choice decision of parents. Did you support these 
decisions with any programs? 
 
1  –  Yes k36c.a.  What were these programs? X 
 
 .........................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................  
2  –  No  
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DOCUMENTS 
 
Type 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Resolution on modifying school districts       
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Council action plan for operating and 
developing the local school system 
     
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Action plan of equal opportunities in public 
education 
    
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Documents on the supporting programs     
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Other:     
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2     
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8. KINDERGARTEN PLACES IN THE TOWN 
 
There are many towns where kindergarten places are in short supply. 
 
k37. What do you think are kindergarten places in your town in short supply? 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No  
 
k38.  Please help me fill out this table! 
 
 
1  –  Number of kindergarten places in the town:         …………….….....places 
 
2  –  Number of children who are old enough to attend kindergarten: 
:                                                                       ……….………..….. children 
 
3  –  Number of local children who attend kindergarten: ….……..….… children 
 
4  –  Number of non-local children who attend kindergarten:....……. children 
 
5  –  Number of local children who cannot enroll because of shortage of 
places:                                                      …...…………………… children 
 
 
k39. Is there any plan to create new kindergarten places?  
 
 
1  –  Yes 
 
2  –  No, there are shortage, but the application rates are not high 
3  –  No. there are other priorities. 
4  –  No, the running cost would be too high. 
 
IF k39=1!  
k40. Where do you stand now in the implementation process of this plan? 
 
1  –  (Re)construction is under way 
2  –  Detailed plan and the necessary financial sources are available  
3  –  Applying for financial support. 
4  –  Have not applied for financial support yet 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Plans, tenders on enlargement/development of 
kindergartens 
1 2     
Council action plan for operating and developing 
the local school system: 
1 2     
Action plan of equal opportunities in public 
education 
1 2    
ONLY 1 ANSWER,  
THE MOST RELEVANT! 
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Other: 
1 2    
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II. EDUCATION OVERVIEW: SPECIAL GROUPS OF STUDENTS 
II.I. HIGH ABILITY STUDENTS 
 
9. ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE TOWN 
 
 
k41. Is there any municipal school in the town where the number of applicants was exceptionally high in the last 5 
years? X  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  –  Yes 
 
 
 
2  –  No    
 
 
 
k42. How many such schools are there? 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CROSS-CHECK WITH THE DATASHEET! 
GO TO k48  
Small towns: consider only a couple of schools (not all of 
them) 
Big towns: consider maximum 5 schools! 
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1. CASE, ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE TOWN 
 
k43. a. School ID, Name: 
 
ID number Short name Address 
   
 
k44. a. We already have information about this school, but we don’t know the enrollment process. How does this 
school screen the applicants? X  
 
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis. 
2  –  Preference for disadvantaged, non-local students  
3  –  Lottery among non-local applicants 
4  –  Admission is based on details, family background is considered  
5  –  Kindergarten-school path (the admission is an automatically ensured from certain kindergarten)   
6  –  Interview. 
7  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores. 
 
k45. a. Has this process changed over the last 5 years? 
 
1  –  Yes k45a.a.  How? 
 
 
                  CODE                                CODE 
2  –  No 
 
 
 If k45=1!  
k46. a. Is this change of the admission process are supported/initiated by the municipality? 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
IF K46=1!  
k47. a. Why did you consider the change of the admission process important? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED! 
Codes from the previous question! 
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2. CASE, ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE TOWN 
 
k43. b. School ID, Name: 
 
ID number Short name Address 
   
 
k44. b. We already have information about this school, but we don’t know the enrollment process. How does this 
school screen the applicants? X 
 
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis. 
2  –  Preference for disadvantaged, non-local students  
3  –  Lottery among non-local applicants 
4  –  Admission is based on details, family background is considered  
5  –  Kindergarten-school path (the admission is an automatically ensured from certain kindergarten)   
6  –  Interview. 
7  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores. 
 
k45. b. Has this process changed over the last 5 years?   
 
1  –  Yes k45b.a.  How? 
 
 
                  CODE                                CODE 
2  –  No 
 
 
If k45=1!  
k46. b. Is this change of the admission process are supported/initiated by the municipality? 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
IF K46=1!  
k47. b. Why did you consider the change of the admission process important? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED! 
Codes from the previous question! 
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3. CASE, ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE TOWN 
 
k43. c. School ID, Name: 
 
ID number Short name Address 
   
 
k44. c. We already have information about this school, but we don’t know the enrollment process. How does this 
school screen the applicants? X 
 
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis. 
2  –  Preference for disadvantaged, non-local students  
3  –  Lottery among non-local applicants 
4  –  Admission is based on details, family background is considered  
5  –  Kindergarten-school path (the admission is an automatically ensured from certain kindergarten)   
6  –  Interview. 
7  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores. 
 
k45. c. Has this process changed over the last 5 years? 
 
1  –  Yes k45c.a.  How? 
 
 
                  CODE                                CODE 
2  –  No 
 
 
If k45=1!  
k46. c. Is this change of the admission process are supported/initiated by the municipality? 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
IF K46=1!  
k47. c. Why did you consider the change of the admission process important? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
  
MULTIPLE ANSWERS ARE ALLOWED! 
Codes from the previous question! 
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DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Documents on the selection forms      
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Council action plan for operating and 
developing the local school system 
 
    
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Action plan of equal opportunities in public 
education 
 
   
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Other: 
 
   
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
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10. ABILITY TRACKING 
 
 
 
 
Let’s see the schools with advanced language, science, humanities courses which give an advantage in the enrollment 
in secondary education! 
  
k48. In which schools are there advanced classes? (Consider Datasheet-Schools worksheet row 31-33. - code 4, 5, 
7.)  
 
 
0  –  There is no such school   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schools 
ID 
number 
Short name! Address 
1. case 
   
2. case 
   
3. case 
   
4. case 
   
5. case 
   
 
 
 
   
DATASHEET! 
ADVANCED CLASSES COLUM: CODE 4,5,7! 
GO TO k51  
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1. CASE, ABILITY TRACKING 
 
k49.  a. Do students from the surrounding villages attend in advanced class(es)? 
 
1  –  Yes k49a.a.  About what percentage of students in the advanced class(es) is non-local? 
 
 
                   %  
2  –  No 
 
k50. a. How does the school screen the applicants for these advanced class(es)?  
 
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis 
2  –  Interview 
3  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores 
 
4  –  Other form of screening (write in): …………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
2. CASE, ABILITY TRACKING 
 
k49.  b. Do students from the surrounding villages attend in advanced class(es)? 
 
1  –  Yes k49b.a.  About what percentage of students in the advanced class(es) is non-local? 
 
 
                   %  
2  –  No 
 
k50. b. How does the school screen the applicants for these advanced class(es)? 
 
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis 
2  –  Interview 
3  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores 
 
4  –  Other form of screening (write in):: ……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
3. CASE, ABILITY TRACKING 
 
k49.  c. Do students from the surrounding villages attend in advanced class(es)? 
 
1  –  Yes k49c.a.  About what percentage of students in the advanced class(es) is non-local? 
 
 
                   %  
2  –  No 
 
k50. c. How does the school screen the applicants for these advanced class(es)? 
 
1  –  First-come, first-admitted basis 
2  –  Interview 
3  –  Admission is based on skills or test scores 
 
4  –  Other form of screening (write in): …………………………………………………………………………………… 
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DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Documents on the selection forms      
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Council action plan for operating and 
developing the local school system 
 
    
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Action plan of equal opportunities in public 
education 
 
   
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Other: 
 
   
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
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11. PRIVATE (“HOME SCHOOLED”) STUDENTS 
 
The issue of “home schooled” students is related on the one hand to high ability students, on the other hand to multiple 
disadvantaged students. Let’s talk about it. 
 
k51. How many “home schooled” students are in the town? 
 
0  –  there is not any “home schooled” student 
 
“home schooled” students 
 
k52. About what percentage of “home schooled” students are overage and/or conduct disorder? 
 
% 
 
k53. Is it a problem your administration should handle? Was it on your agenda in the last 5 years?  
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
IF k53=1!  
k54. What were the most important decisions? X 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
k55. Is there cooperation between the schools and the child welfare service? 
 
1  –  Yes, the cooperation is good  
2  –  There is cooperation, but it has to be improved 
3  –  There is not cooperation 
4  –  The municipality does not intervene in the cooperation between the schools and the child welfare service 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Resolution(s) on the programs dealing with private 
students 1 2     
Program documents 
1 2    
Council action plan for operating and developing the 
local school system 1 2     
Action plan of equal opportunities in public education 
1 2    
Other: 
1 2    
GO TO k56  
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II.II. MULTIPLE DISADVANTAGED AND  
ROMA STUDENTS 
 
12. THE PROBLEM OF REGISTRATION OF STUDENTS WITH “MULTIPLE 
DISADVANTAGES” 
 
 
Parents of multiple disadvantaged children have the right to receive financial subsidy for schooling the children. To 
this a registered multiple disadvantaged status is necessary. However, the statistics show that it is likely that many 
students with multiple disadvantages are not registered. 
 
k56. Is it likely that many students with multiple disadvantages are not registered in the town?  
 
 
 
 
1  –  Yes 
 
 
 
 
2  –  No   
 
 
K56. a. About what percentage of students with multiple disadvantages do you think are not registered? 
 
 
                     %   
 
 
 
k57.  What do you do to solve this problem? X 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Local council resolution (draft resolution) on 
the programs 
1 2     
Other: 
1 2    
 
  
GO TO k58  
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13. PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE DISADVANTAGED AND ROMA CHILDREN 
IN KINDERGARTENS 
 
 
Numerous studies found that one of the reasons for lower academic performance of multiple disadvantaged and Roma 
students is the unsatisfactory participation in kindergartens (low enrollment rate before the age of 5, absenteeism). 
 
k58.  Is the low participation of Roma children in kindergartens a problem in your town?  
  
 
1  –  Yes 
 
 
2  –  No   
 
 
k59. Do you have any program or initiative to solve this problem? 
 
1  –  Yes k59.a.  What kind of programs are these? X 
 
 .........................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................  
 .........................................................................................................  
 
2  –  No, because: X k59.b. ...........................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Documents on programs/initiatives 
1 2     
Other: 
1 2    
 
 
 
 
 
GO TO k60  
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14. EDUCATIONAL PEER EFFECTS AND THE MULTIPLE DISADVANTAGED 
STUDENTS 
 
Let’s see the municipal schools in the town where the proportion of multiple disadvantaged and Roma students is 
significantly lower than the average of the town? 
 
k60. Which are these schools? 
 
0  –  There is no such school   
 
 
 
Schools 
ID number Short name! Address 
   
   
   
   
   
 
k61. How many such schools are there? 
 
 
 
                   school(s) 
 
 
In these schools it could be beneficial to increase the share of multiple disadvantaged/Roma students because of the 
advantage from more interactions with higher achieving peers. 
BASED ON THE DATASHEET! 
GO TO k63 
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k62.  What can you do for enhancing the proper representation of Roma students? X 
 
ID 
number 
a. What can you do? b. What have you done? 
   
   
   
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Local council resolution (draft resolution) on the 
programs 
     
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Programs reports 
 
   
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Other: 
 
   
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
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15. SCHOOLS FOR THE ROMA STUDENTS 
k63. Is there any school for the Roma in the town, where the share of Roma students is exceptionally high?  
 
 
 
 
 
0  –  There is no such school  
 
 
 
Schools for the Roma 
ID 
number 
Short name! Address 
1.case 
   
2.case 
   
3.case 
   
4.case 
   
5.case 
   
 
 
 
k64. How many such schools are there? 
 
                   school(s) 
  
BASED ON THE DATASHEET! 
“School for the Roma”: share of Roma students is over 40%! 
GO TO k69  
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1. CASE, SCHOOLS FOR THE ROMA STUDENTS 
 
k65.  a. Is it an ethnic minority school?  
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
k66. a. What do you plan to do with this school? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 k66.a. a. Incorporated as an independent unit into another school, 
education is continued? 1  –  Yes  2  –  No   
 
IF CLOSURE IS MENTIONED! 
k67. a. How do you plan to close this school? 
 
1  –  Closing gradually. 
3  –  Students together to other school. 
4  –  Students proportionally to other schools. 
5  –  Other (write in):……………………………………………………………………………. 
IF K67=3!  
k68. a. Which school will be the recipient school according to the plan? 
 
 
Recipient school 
ID number Short name! Address 
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2. CASE, SCHOOLS FOR THE ROMA STUDENTS 
 
k65.  b. Is it an ethnic minority school? 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
k66. b. What do you plan to do with this school? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 k66.b.a. Incorporated as an independent unit into another school, 
education is continued? 1  –  Yes  2  –  No   
 
IF CLOSURE IS MENTIONED! 
k67. b. How do you plan to close this school? 
 
1  –  Closing gradually. 
3  –  Students together to other school. 
4  –  Students proportionally to other schools. 
5  –  Other (write in):……………………………………………………………………………. 
IF K67=3!  
k68. b. Which school will be the recipient school according to the plan? 
 
 
Recipient school 
ID number Short name! Address 
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3.  CASE, SCHOOLS FOR THE ROMA STUDENTS 
 
k65.  c. Is it an ethnic minority school? 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
k66. c. What do you plan to do with this school? 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 k66.c.a. Incorporated as an independent unit into another school, 
education is continued? 1  –  Yes  2  –  No   
 
IF CLOSURE IS MENTIONED! 
k67. a. How do you plan to close this school? 
 
1  –  Closing gradually. 
3  –  Students together to other school. 
4  –  Students proportionally to other schools. 
5  –  Other (write in):……………………………………………………………………………. 
IF K67=3!  
k68. c. Which school will be the recipient school according to the plan? 
Recipient school 
ID number ID number ID number 
   
   
   
   
   
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
Resolution on closing the Roma school      
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Other: 
 
   
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
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Case 3: 1 2    
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16. EDUCATION FOR THE MULTIPLE DISADVANTED STUDENTS OUTSIDE 
THE CITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
k69. Is it typical that the multiple disadvantaged/Roma students study outside the city? (not SEN students!)  
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
 
k70. Is there any agreement with other town on organizing education for the multiple disadvantaged/Roma students 
outside the city? 
  
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
 
 
IF k70=1!  
 
k71. How many agreements are there? 
 
1. agreement   Town with which the agreement is: ....................................................................  
2. agreement   Town with which the agreement is: ....................................................................  
3. agreement   Town with which the agreement is: ....................................................................  
 
  
EVERY AGREEMENT 
about organizing education for the 
multiple disadvantaged/Roma students 
outside the city! 
GO TO k74  
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1. AGREEMENT, EDUCATION FOR THE MULTIPLE DISADVANTED STUDENTS OUTSIDE 
THE CITY 
 
 
k72.  a. What was the reason for this agreement?X 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
 
k73. a. Do you help the student to travel to the school? 
 
1  –  Providing/supporting school bus 
2  –  Discount travel, financial support 
3  –  Other (write in): …………………………………………. 
 
 
2. AGREEMENT, EDUCATION FOR THE MULTIPLE DISADVANTED STUDENTS OUTSIDE 
THE CITY 
 
 
k72.  b. What was the reason for this agreement?X 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
 
k73. b. Do you help the student to travel to the school? 
 
1  –  Providing/supporting school bus 
2  –  Discount travel, financial support 
3  –  Other (write in): …………………………………………. 
 
 
3.  AGREEMENT, EDUCATION FOR THE MULTIPLE DISADVANTED STUDENTS OUTSIDE 
THE CITY 
 
 
k72.  c. What was the reason for this agreement?X 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
 
k73. c. Do you help the student to travel to the school? 
 
1  –  Providing/supporting school bus 
2  –  Discount travel, financial support 
3  –  Other (write in): …………………………………………. 
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DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting for 
it 
Received 
Agreement(s)      
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
Other: 
 
   
Case 1: 1 2    
Case 2: 1 2    
Case 3: 1 2    
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17. PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL INTEGRATION PROGRAMS AND 
SUPPORT 
 
 
 
 
k74. Have the city participated in school integration programs in the last 5 years?  
 
 
1  –  No  
 
2  –  Yes, integration programs and support  
 
3  –  Yes, integration programs and support AND EU grants: HEF OP 2.1.3; 2.1.5; 2.1.5b; 2.1.7; 2.1.8, TÁM OP 
from 3.3.2 to 3.3.5 
 
IF k74=3!  
 
k75. Which grants did you get?X 
 
1. Number: ........................................... Date: ......................................  
2. Number: ........................................... Date: ......................................  
3. Number: ........................................... Date: ......................................  
 
 
IF k74=2 or k74=3!  
 
k76. What share of schools has involved in integration support programs?  
 
1  –  All of them, 
2  –  50% or more, 
3  –  less than 50%. 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
OOIH agreements of cooperation 
1 2     
 
 
 
GO TO k77  
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II.III. STUDENTS WITH SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS (SEN) 
 
18. EDUCATION OF STUDENTS WITH SPEICAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 
 
k77. Please, help us to fill out the table below! We ask you about the moderately mentally disabled students. 
 
 
Number of 
moderately 
mentally 
disabled 
students in 
the town  
Number of moderately mentally disabled students 
who are educated 
Integrated 
In special (remedial) 
classes  
In special schools  Academic 
year 
2005/2006     
2010/2011     
 
k78.  Has the education of the moderately mentally disabled students significantly changed since the 2005/2006 
academic year?  
 
0  –  No 
 
1  –  Special (remedial) class has been established 
2  –  Special (remedial) class has been closed 
3  –  Special (remedial) school has been closed 
4  –  Special (remedial) school has been established 
5  –  Integrated education started in some schools 
6  –  Other (write in): ……………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
In the last years the integrated education of SEN students was one of the main priorities of the educational policy. 
 
k79. Is there any school which is participated in any SEN integration programs? 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
  
 k79.a. Please, give us some details of these programs! What was the reason behind them? X 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page 
Waiting 
for it 
Received 
(Draft) Resolution(s) on the programs of 
integrated/segregated education 
1 2     
TÖBB VÁLASZ LEHET! 
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Council action plan for performing tasks and 
operating and developing a network of institutions 
1 2    
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19. RESTRICTING THE PRACTICE OF CLASSIFYING STUDENTS INTO SEN 
STATUS EXCEEDINGLY 
 
 
 
According to the figures the proportion of students with special educational needs are above the EU average. 
 
k80. Do you have any program for reducing the classification of students into SEN status exceedingly? X 
 
 
1  –  Yes 
2  –  No   
  
 k80.a. If you have, please, give some details of these! If you do not have any programs, we also would like to 
know your opinion about this issue! X 
 
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 .......................................................................................................................................................................  
 
 
DOCUMENTS 
 
Name 
1 – Paper 
2 - Electronic 
Page Waiting for it 
Receive
d 
Resolution(s) on the programs 
1 2     
 
 
 
 
 
 
END OF INTERVIEW: 
 2011.  ................ month  ...........  day  ................  hour  ............. min 
 
